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1Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute2Clear out junk files and repair common Windows errors3Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesOpen-source software risk goes beyond known vulnerabilities. OWASP’s dedicated Top 10 Risks for Open Source Software covers security, legal, and operational issues that can affect components you select, build, and ship. The practical response is to make dependencies visible, verify what you consume, and keep evaluating them throughout their lifecycle.
What are the top open-source software security risks?
OWASP’s open-source list is a risk taxonomy, not a ranking of ten exploitable flaws. It is also distinct from the OWASP Top 10:2025, an awareness document for web application security; its A03 category is Software Supply Chain Failures (Top 10:2025; A03: Software Supply Chain Failures).
1. Known vulnerabilities
A component version may have a publicly disclosed vulnerability, but an alert does not by itself establish that your application can be exploited. Inventory direct and transitive dependencies, monitor advisories, and prioritize using severity, evidence of exploitation, and whether the affected code is present and reachable in your application. NIST describes software composition analysis (SCA) for identifying known vulnerabilities and binary analysis for examining components in supplied binaries or images (NIST Secure Software Development Framework).
2. Compromise of a legitimate package
An attacker who compromises a maintainer account, project resource, or repository may distribute malicious code under a package users already trust. Check provenance and package behavior, review code where practical, build from trusted source when feasible, and consider vetted internal repositories or mirrors. OWASP cautions that no single action prevents every compromised package.
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3. Name confusion attacks
Typosquatting, brand-jacking, and ecosystem naming tricks can make a malicious package look like the intended one. Verify the exact package identity, maintainer and repository signals, release behavior, and install hooks; use signatures where the ecosystem supports them. Treat metadata as a clue, not proof, because package metadata can be forged.
4. Unmaintained software
A project that no longer provides timely fixes can leave users exposed. Review stated support commitments, issue and release history, and project backing. Low activity alone does not prove abandonment: mature, feature-complete software may remain supported. For dependencies without meaningful support, plan either a replacement or a responsible downstream patching path.
5. Outdated software
Delaying upgrades can make emergency updates harder and leave a team on a branch that no longer receives fixes. Make dependency updates recurring work, automate update proposals where useful, and test upgrades for breaking behavior rather than letting version drift accumulate.
6. Untracked dependencies
A package manifest or software bill of materials (SBOM) may miss vendored code, rebundled binaries, manual installs, and development or build tools. Assess whether inventory methods cover packages and files, and include the build environment as well as the software you ship. NIST’s supply-chain guidance also discusses SCA and binary analysis as ways to improve component visibility (NIST Secure Software Development Framework).
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7. License and regulatory risk
A component may have no stated license, impose terms that do not fit your use, include files under different licenses, or conflict with regulatory requirements. Review license metadata and relevant component files against how you plan to distribute, link, deploy, or use the software. Seek qualified legal review when the decision has significant consequences.
8. Immature software
Missing tests, documentation, review practices, or established release conventions can increase reliability and security risk. Inspect project artifacts such as tests, documentation, continuous integration (CI), and versioning practices. Badges and dependent counts can inform an assessment, but neither guarantees security or quality.
9. Unapproved or mutable changes
An unversioned download, mutable tag or reference, tampered artifact, or insecure transfer can silently change what a build consumes. Pin immutable versions or commit identifiers, verify digests or signatures, and use secure distribution channels so builds can be tied to approved inputs.
10. Under- or over-sized dependencies
A tiny package may add substantial supply-chain exposure for little functionality; a large one may bring unused capabilities, attack surface, and transitive dependencies. Check which capabilities your application actually uses, disable unused features when possible, and consider a smaller alternative or an internal implementation when the trade-off is proportionate.
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How should you choose between dependencies?
When several components meet the same need, compare the evidence that matters to your use case rather than relying on a single score or badge.
| What to compare | What to examine |
|---|---|
| Security exposure | Known vulnerabilities, exploit evidence, and whether affected code is relevant to your application. |
| Maintenance and support | Published support commitments, release and issue history, and project backing. |
| Provenance and integrity | Where source and artifacts come from, and whether versions, signatures, or digests can be verified. |
| Inventory and licensing | Whether component contents can be identified and license terms are clear for the intended use. |
| Maturity | Tests, documentation, CI, review practices, and consistent release conventions. |
| Scope and attack surface | How much functionality and how many transitive dependencies the component adds relative to what you need. |
These signals help structure a review; none, alone, establishes that a dependency is safe. OWASP references Dependency-Track as a tool option, while NIST describes SCA, binary analysis, and vetted internal repositories as possible implementation aids. Tooling can improve visibility and workflow, but teams still need to assess findings in context.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What should a practical mitigation program do?
- Build an inventory. Track direct and transitive packages, vendored and rebundled components, manual additions, and build-time tools. Check whether package- and file-level methods capture what actually enters builds and releases.
- Assess before adoption. Confirm exact package identity and provenance; inspect maintenance, maturity, license clarity, integrity controls, and how much functionality the dependency adds.
- Make builds reproducible and verifiable. Pin immutable versions or commit identifiers, verify digests or signatures where available, and use secure distribution channels or vetted internal repositories.
- Monitor and update continuously. Watch vulnerability advisories and project support status, automate update proposals where appropriate, and test changes for compatibility.
- Triage findings in context. Weigh severity and threat evidence, then determine whether the component is actually present and relevant to the application before setting response priority.
- Prepare for unsupported components. Decide how to replace a dependency or maintain a downstream patch if its project stops providing needed fixes.
- Review obligations and controls. Check license and regulatory fit for the intended use, and involve legal or compliance specialists when consequences warrant it.
The U.S. federal government’s Executive Order 14028 (2021), quoted by NIST, calls for “ensuring and attesting, to the extent practicable, to the integrity and provenance of open-source software components used within any portion of a product” (NIST Secure Software Development Framework). The wording underscores why an inventory and vulnerability scan alone are not a complete supply-chain approach.
What do the published statistics say—and not say?
OWASP’s open-source risk page attributes several figures to named organizations, but does not state publication years for them in the page text. They should be read as attributed findings, not as verified current rates for every organization or codebase:
- OWASP attributes to a Synopsys Open Source Security and Risk Analysis report the finding that 89% of codebases contain open-source software more than four years out of date.
- OWASP attributes to Synopsys the finding that 91% of codebases contain components with no new development in over two years.
- OWASP attributes to Endor Labs’ State of Dependency Management the finding that 95% of vulnerabilities exist in transitive dependencies.
The OWASP page does not give the report years alongside these statistics, and their original reports and sampling methods are not established here. They are useful reminders to look beyond direct dependencies and recent release activity, not a basis for predicting the condition of a particular codebase.
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