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What a cryptographic inventory should contain
NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) defines a cryptographic inventory as a descriptive record of cryptography across an organization’s systems, applications, services, devices, and data flows. It is more than a list of algorithm names: it should show where cryptography is used, what it does, which information it protects, and what other components depend on it.
Record metadata about keys and certificates, but never put key material itself in the inventory. The goal is to make cryptographic use understandable enough to support ownership, risk ranking, and migration decisions.
Minimum useful inventory fields
- Asset and ownership: system, application, service, device, component, environment, and responsible owner.
- Cryptographic use: algorithm, key type, protocol or service, and purpose—such as key establishment, authentication, access control, digital signatures, software or firmware updates, or data protection.
- Certificate and key metadata: certificate and certificate-chain relationships; key owner, algorithm, expiration, and lifecycle status. Do not store secret or private key material.
- Dependencies: software, firmware, libraries, hardware, cloud services, suppliers, and build or delivery components involved.
- Protected information and processes: datasets and critical processes, sensitivity, expected confidentiality or secrecy lifetime, and routes used to access or transfer the data.
- Migration status: vendor support, available upgrade path, stated PQC roadmap and timing, and unresolved technical or supplier dependencies.
Where to look for cryptography
Search across the organization rather than relying on a single scanner or network view. CISA, NSA, and NIST advise organizations to seek visibility into cryptography in both IT and operational technology (OT). Their August 17, 2023 fact sheet identifies discovery across multiple layers as important, while warning that tools may not reveal cryptography embedded inside products.
The Tool Desk
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| Discovery surface | What to examine | Important qualification |
|---|---|---|
| Networks and protocols | Connections and protocol use between systems, services, and external parties. | A network observation should be tied to the communicating systems, service, purpose, and protected data where possible. |
| Endpoints, servers, and user systems | Cryptographic services, configurations, certificates, and applications on managed devices and servers. | Correlate findings with asset and identity records so an observation can be assigned and assessed. |
| Applications, libraries, and dependencies | Application code and the cryptographic libraries or components it calls. | Algorithm-name searches alone may miss uses; capture the function and context of each finding. |
| Firmware, updates, and build pipelines | Cryptography in firmware, software-update mechanisms, code, dependencies, and CI/CD pipelines. | Pay particular attention to the signatures and validation paths used to trust software and firmware updates. |
| Cloud and supplier services | Cryptographic functions provided by cloud services, hosted services, and products obtained through suppliers. | Provider or product internals may not be visible to your own discovery tools; request supplier documentation. |
| OT and constrained environments | Devices, control systems, and supporting services within the organization’s OT scope. | Plan discovery around the operating constraints and access requirements of these environments. |
Where available, correlate findings with asset management, identity and access management, endpoint detection and response, and continuous-monitoring records. This helps connect algorithm-level observations to an owner, operational importance, and business or mission process.
A repeatable workflow for building the inventory
1. Set scope, ownership, and intended use
Form a cross-functional team that includes IT, security, privacy and risk, procurement, application owners, supplier management, and OT representatives where applicable. Define which organizational boundaries and systems are in scope, how much detail is required, who maintains the records, and how findings will feed risk assessment and migration planning. Treat the inventory as maintained data, not a one-time scan.
2. Discover cryptography across the defined scope
Use discovery tools across the surfaces in the table, and look for cryptographic functions in context rather than relying only on strings that name algorithms. For each observation, aim to identify its system, service, protocol, application, owner, purpose, and protected information.
3. Reconcile observations with existing records
Match discoveries to asset, identity, endpoint, and monitoring data where possible. Resolve duplicate or conflicting asset names, identify unassigned findings, and record the source and date of each observation so the inventory can be revisited and updated.
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Ask owners to confirm what a finding does and which processes depend on it. Ask suppliers about cryptography embedded within products or services, including cloud-hosted and supply-chain components. Record unknowns explicitly: “not detected” means the tool did not find something, not that cryptography is absent.
5. Classify cryptographic uses and assess risk
Identify which uses rely on public-key algorithms that may require change, then assess the consequences and timing of migration. Keep algorithm identification separate from risk ranking: the same algorithm can support different functions, data, and business consequences in different systems.
6. Turn the findings into a migration roadmap
Use the inventory to map dependencies, sequence changes across systems and suppliers, and track progress. Engage vendors early and include update expectations in procurement and contract planning. Migration may require engineering, compatibility testing, configuration changes, and coordinated updates to products, services, and protocols.
How to identify likely quantum-vulnerable uses
The joint CISA, NSA, and NIST fact sheet, Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (August 17, 2023), names RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA as examples of public-key algorithms used by products, protocols, and services that may need to be updated, replaced, or significantly altered for PQC.
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Rank #3
Use findings to locate the actual function and dependencies of each use rather than labelling an entire system “quantum-vulnerable” based only on an algorithm name. Prioritize investigation of:
- Public-key-based key-establishment paths and the sensitive data they protect.
- Digital signatures used to authenticate software, firmware, documents, or other important artifacts.
- Authentication and access-control mechanisms that depend on public-key cryptography.
- Certificate chains and protocols whose changes may affect multiple systems or external connections.
Do not treat all cryptographic algorithms or uses as having the same quantum exposure. Classification should use current standards and transition guidance, and should account for what the cryptography does in the specific system.
Prioritize systems by consequence and migration difficulty
Start with information that must remain confidential for a long time. The CISA, NSA, and NIST fact sheet describes “harvest now, decrypt later”: an adversary could collect encrypted information now and seek to decrypt it later if a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer becomes available. The key question for each dataset is how long it needs protection, not a guessed date for when such a computer will arrive.
Then rank systems using the factors below. A high-impact finding may deserve early planning even if its migration is difficult; record both urgency and difficulty rather than collapsing them into one score.
- Data sensitivity and protection lifetime: how damaging disclosure would be and how long confidentiality must last.
- Mission or business impact: consequences if a system, process, or trust mechanism fails during migration or remains unchanged.
- System criticality: whether the asset supports a High Value Asset, a High Impact System, critical infrastructure, or an essential OT process.
- Exposure and access: external connections and the role of public-key cryptography in access control, authentication, or key establishment.
- Migration complexity: dependency chains, supplier timelines, compatibility constraints, and the availability of an upgrade path.
For federal civilian executive branch agencies, CISA’s September 2024 discovery strategy describes initial reporting priorities that include High Impact Systems, High Value Assets, and other systems an agency identifies as especially vulnerable. It also highlights data expected to remain mission-sensitive in 2035 and asymmetric-encryption-based logical access controls. The 2035 criterion is a federal prioritization measure, not a forecast of quantum-computer availability or a universal deadline for private organizations.
What to ask suppliers
Because embedded cryptography may be invisible to customer-side tools, supplier responses are a necessary part of validation. Ask suppliers to provide:
- Cryptographic components used in the product or service, including embedded components and relevant product versions.
- The functions those components support, including signing, key establishment, authentication, access control, and update validation.
- Their plans and timelines for PQC support, and which upgrades or product versions will provide it.
- Whether migration will require configuration changes, application changes, downtime, or coordination with other products and services.
- Known dependencies, end-of-support implications, and expected migration costs.
Record the answer, its date, the supplier contact or source, and unresolved questions alongside the affected inventory entries. A roadmap statement is not the same as a supported product update; track delivery and compatibility work as separate dependencies.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.How to evaluate discovery approaches
When comparing tools or methods, assess whether they can support an inventory that stays useful after the initial discovery effort. These are evaluation criteria, not claims about any particular product.
- Coverage: visibility across network, endpoint, server, application, library, firmware, cloud, and build-pipeline environments.
- Context and ownership: ability to connect cryptographic observations to systems, owners, business processes, data sensitivity, and dependencies.
- Blind-spot handling: support for capturing unknowns and managing supplier disclosure for embedded cryptography.
- Integration: ability to reconcile results with asset, identity, endpoint, and risk-management records.
- Operational fit: deployment scope, access requirements, operating model, and suitability for OT or constrained systems.
- Maintainability: exportability, auditability, repeatability, and support for keeping records current.
Current standards and policy context
NIST’s post-quantum cryptography program page says three finalized PQC standards are ready for implementation and advises organizations to begin applying them to migrate systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. Standard publication is a starting point, not proof that every product, service, or protocol already supports the standards; implementation and coordinated updates remain necessary.
NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, is an initial public draft published November 12, 2024. Its comment period closed January 10, 2025. It describes an expected transition approach, but it is not a final universal migration schedule. Check current NIST and applicable sector or agency guidance when setting dates or describing obligations.
Federal inventory and migration requirements, including 6 USC 1526 and federal executive guidance, apply within their specified federal scope. They should not be presented as statutory requirements for every private organization.
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