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Random freezes, missing sound and display glitches usually trace back to one bad driver. Find and replace yours safely.Free scan · under a minuteA useful post-quantum cryptography (PQC) inventory records key establishment and digital signatures as separate cryptographic uses. Key establishment creates a shared secret; signatures authenticate a signer and help detect unauthorized changes. A certificate’s signature algorithm does not tell you which key-establishment mechanism a connection uses, so track both independently for each relevant system and data flow.
What a cryptographic inventory records
NIST NCCoE describes a cryptographic inventory as a descriptive record of the cryptography used across an organization’s systems, applications, services, devices, and data flows. Its purpose is to show where cryptography is used and what depends on it, so teams can assess exposure and plan migration rather than treating a system as a single, opaque “uses encryption” item.
Create a record for each distinct cryptographic use or dependency. A single service may need several records: for example, a TLS connection can use a certificate signature to authenticate a server and a separate key-establishment mechanism to create a shared secret. The record should identify the asset, environment, owner, protocol, endpoints, purpose, data protected, algorithm, implementation, evidence, and migration status.
Record key metadata such as key type, owner, associated algorithm, application, expiration, and lifecycle status when known. Do not put private keys, shared secrets, seed material, or other secret key material in the inventory. NIST’s Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQ describes inventory contents and the PQC Inventory Workbook as a resource for centralized tracking.
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Keep key establishment and signatures on separate tracks
The distinction is about cryptographic function, not whether an algorithm is “public-key” or appears in a certificate. A key-establishment mechanism helps parties derive a shared secret over a public channel; symmetric cryptography can then use that secret to protect communications. A digital signature authenticates a signer and can reveal unauthorized modification. These uses have different dependencies, tests, and migration plans.
| Inventory track | What it does | Record these details | PQC standards in the cited NIST set |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key establishment, including key exchange | Enables parties to establish a shared secret, commonly as part of a protocol connection. | Protocol and negotiation, algorithm and parameters, endpoints, key type and lifecycle metadata, implementation, resulting symmetric protection, dependent systems, and data flow. | FIPS 203, ML-KEM. |
| Digital signatures | Authenticates a signer and helps detect unauthorized changes to signed material. | Signature algorithm, signer or issuer role, certificate chain where applicable, validity and expiration, relying parties, and where signing and verification occur. | FIPS 204, ML-DSA; FIPS 205, SLH-DSA. |
Do not infer the connection’s key-establishment algorithm from the certificate signature. A certificate can be signed with one algorithm while the protocol negotiates a separate mechanism for establishing a shared secret. Record the certificate and its chain on the signature track, and record observed or configured protocol negotiation on the key-establishment track. This applies to TLS as well as other protocols that combine authentication and key establishment.
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Design the inventory around a usable record
Use a stable asset identifier and a separate identifier for each cryptographic use. Link records that depend on or share a component, but do not collapse distinct operations into one row. A practical schema can be grouped as follows:
- Asset and accountability: system, application, service or device; environment; business owner; technical owner; and migration owner.
- Use and exposure: function class (key establishment, digital signature, encryption, hashing, authentication, or other); purpose; protocol; endpoints; data flow; protected data sensitivity; and how long confidentiality is required.
- Implementation: algorithm, library or provider, implementation location, parameters or security level when known, configuration or negotiation evidence, and current status.
- Key-establishment details: key type and lifecycle metadata, protocol negotiation, participating endpoints, dependent symmetric protection, and systems or services relying on the resulting secret.
- Signature details: signature algorithm and role (such as certificate issuer, code signer, document signer, or message signer); certificate and chain where relevant; validity and expiration; relying parties; and signing and verification locations.
- Evidence and planning: discovery source, confidence, date observed, dependency links, operational constraints, planned action, test and interoperability results, status, and accountable owner.
Keep “unknown” distinguishable from “not applicable.” For example, an unobserved TLS negotiation is unknown, not evidence that the connection has no key establishment. Preserve the evidence and observation date so teams can revisit uncertain or stale entries instead of treating them as verified facts.
Build and maintain the inventory in stages
- Define scope and ownership. Include relevant hardware, software, services, environments, and data flows. Assign business and technical owners so findings and migration actions have accountable counterparts.
- Discover cryptographic uses. Combine available configuration and architecture records with observations from systems and services. Look for protocols and services such as TLS, SSH, VPNs, code signing, email encryption, and certificate-based authentication. Record the evidence and confidence rather than presenting inferred details as confirmed.
- Split each use by function. For each connection or workflow, create separate records for key establishment and signatures where both are present. Also record other cryptographic uses as distinct functions when relevant.
- Map dependencies and protected data. Connect the use to endpoints, applications, libraries, certificate chains, relying parties, downstream services, and the data it protects. Note sensitivity and the period for which confidentiality is needed.
- Assign migration status and action. Identify the owner, target action, constraints, and status for each use. Preserve a link to the original evidence and record test or interoperability results as the migration proceeds.
- Reconcile and refresh. Compare inventory records with system and configuration changes, revisit entries with low confidence, and update the observation date when the use is checked again. Track changed configurations and retired dependencies rather than allowing old records to look current indefinitely.
Prioritize by exposure, data lifetime, and migration difficulty
NIST’s migration FAQ highlights sensitive data that must remain confidential for a long time and warns that organizations cannot effectively prioritize cryptography they have not identified. Begin with uses of quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, then assess how damaging exposure would be, how long the data needs protection, how broadly the use is depended upon, and how much lead time a change will require.
- Data and confidentiality horizon: prioritize sensitive information whose confidentiality must endure for many years, especially where an adversary could capture encrypted traffic now and attempt to decrypt it later.
- System criticality and exposure: weigh business impact, external reachability, and the consequences of losing authentication or confidentiality.
- Dependency breadth: identify shared libraries, services, certificate chains, clients, relying parties, and embedded devices that can turn a local change into a coordinated migration.
- Operational lead time: account for procurement, deployment windows, protocol and product support, validation, and interoperability work.
Use separate risk and migration decisions for the two tracks. Replacing a signature scheme does not by itself replace key establishment, and changing key establishment does not migrate certificate or code-signing signatures. A system can therefore have different exposure, owners, test plans, and completion dates for its separate uses.
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Use tools as discovery and tracking aids, not as proof of completeness
NIST’s FAQ says the PQC Coalition provides a PQC Inventory Workbook that can serve as a starting point for centralized tracking at the system or asset level. Treat it as a structure for organizing findings and actions, not as evidence that discovery is automated or that governance and dependency analysis are complete.
NIST NCCoE’s migration project identifies cryptographic visibility and risk management, as well as interoperability and benchmarking, among its workstreams. When assessing any discovery or migration tool, compare its demonstrated capabilities against the inventory you need:
- Coverage across hardware, software, services, and relevant environments.
- Ability to distinguish key establishment from certificate and other signature uses.
- Evidence quality, confidence indicators, and export formats that teams can review and retain.
- Dependency mapping and connections to asset or configuration management.
- Ownership, risk, and migration-status workflows.
- Support for interoperability testing and benchmarking.
No tool output should be treated as complete merely because it lists algorithms or certificates. Validate whether it captures protocol negotiation, actual use, dependencies, ownership, and evidence at the granularity needed to plan a change. NIST’s project context is that organizations need visibility into vulnerable public-key algorithm use across hardware, software, and services before they can prioritize migration roadmaps.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Map the inventory to NIST’s PQC standards and transition guidance
On August 13, 2024, NIST announced approval of three initial PQC FIPS. Put each standard on the function track it addresses; the standards are not interchangeable.
| Standard | Algorithm | Inventory use |
|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM | Key establishment |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA | Digital signatures |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA | Digital signatures |
NIST NCCoE says the standardization effort began in 2016 and that the August 2024 standards followed that process. These dates describe the standards effort; they do not establish how quickly a particular organization can migrate its systems.
NIST IR 8547, published as an initial public draft on November 12, 2024, describes an expected transition approach; its public comment period closed January 10, 2025. NIST’s project overview summarizes the draft schedule as deprecating and ultimately removing quantum-vulnerable algorithms from NIST standards by 2035, with high-risk systems moving earlier. This is a schedule described by draft transition guidance, not a universal deadline for every organization or system. Sector rules, contracts, jurisdictions, and risk decisions may impose different requirements. Check the current NIST guidance, FIPS errata, and applicable rules before setting a binding date.
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What the inventory should make possible
A migration-ready inventory lets a team answer, for every relevant use: what cryptographic function is being performed, which algorithm and implementation are involved, what data or trust relationship is at stake, what depends on it, how reliable the evidence is, who owns the change, and what remains to test. Most importantly, it prevents a certificate signature from being mistaken for the mechanism that establishes a connection’s shared secret. Keep those tracks distinct from discovery through risk review, standards mapping, testing, and completion reporting.
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