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AI is used in warfare in distinct ways: autonomous weapons can select and engage targets after activation, decision-support systems can advise commanders, and AI-enabled cyber capabilities can help identify and exploit vulnerabilities. These uses raise different risks, but none removes human responsibility. Existing international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to military uses of AI; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also calling for a new binding instrument on autonomous weapons. That instrument has not been adopted: as of 5 October 2026, the ICRC describes a November conference as an opportunity to begin negotiations.
How is AI being used in warfare?
“Military AI” describes several kinds of capability, not one weapon or one level of automation. The distinction matters: a tool that recommends an action to a commander is not the same as a weapon system that selects and engages a target, and neither is identical to software used in cyber operations.
| Application | What it does | Central concern |
|---|---|---|
| Autonomous weapon system (AWS) | After activation, it can select and engage targets without further human intervention, potentially using sensor information and a generalized target profile. | Whether people can adequately anticipate, control, and limit its effects. |
| AI-based decision-support system (AI-DSS) | Analyzes information and gives recommendations to human commanders. | Whether people can assess recommendations independently, especially when the system is opaque, its data is poor, or its output is manipulated. |
| AI-enabled cyber capability | Can help identify and exploit vulnerabilities in digital systems. | Whether operations spill over to civilian infrastructure or essential services, or contribute to escalation in interconnected systems. |
These categories can overlap in a military workflow, but they should not be conflated. A human may approve an AI-generated recommendation while still being influenced by automation bias; that does not make the decision-support tool an autonomous weapon. Conversely, the defining feature of an AWS is not a humanoid robot or a weapon’s appearance, but its ability to select and engage targets without further human intervention after activation. The ICRC explains this distinction in its 3 March 2026 paper, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Selected Issues.
What are autonomous weapons?
Autonomy concerns target selection and engagement
In the ICRC’s definition, an autonomous weapon system can, once activated, select and engage targets without further human intervention. It may react to sensor information and a generalized target profile. The person who activates it may not know the precise target, time, or place at which force will be used.
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This shifts the practical question from whether a system is “a robot” to how its operation is bounded: what it can identify as a target, where and for how long it can operate, in what circumstances, and at what scale. The ICRC highlights difficulty predicting and controlling effects, risks to civilians and combatants, possible escalation, challenges in applying rules governing hostilities, and ethical concerns about delegating life-and-death decisions.
Human responsibility does not transfer to the weapon
The ICRC’s position is that a weapon does not itself comply with IHL. The humans who use it remain responsible for meeting obligations governing the conduct of hostilities. Automation may change how a decision is made, but it does not turn legal duties into duties of the machine.
Can AI make military targeting decisions?
AI can contribute to analysis and recommendations used in military decision-making, including targeting workflows. A decision-support system is intended to support human judgment, not replace it. Whether a human is formally “in the loop” is not, by itself, proof that the person has meaningfully assessed a recommendation.
How decision-support can go wrong
- Poor or context-insensitive data: Input that is incomplete, inaccurate, or poorly suited to the situation can produce misleading recommendations.
- Opacity: If users cannot understand how a system reached an output, they may struggle to evaluate whether it fits the circumstances.
- Automation bias: A commander may defer too readily to a system’s recommendation rather than exercise independent judgment.
- Adversarial manipulation: Data or systems may be manipulated in ways that distort outputs.
- Rapid propagation of error: Erroneous recommendations may spread quickly through connected decision processes.
The ICRC’s current FAQ on AI in the military domain refers to 16 preliminary recommendations for military decision-support systems, emphasizing human judgment and control. The available description establishes their focus, not the full text of each recommendation. The ICRC has also identified UN General Assembly Resolution 79/239, adopted 31 December 2024, and the UN Secretary-General’s report A/80/78, dated 5 June 2025, as relevant steps in the military-AI debate.
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AI-enabled cyber capabilities can help identify and exploit vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer systems. The ICRC warns that such capabilities can increase risks of indiscriminate attacks, incidental damage to civilian infrastructure, and uncontrolled escalation, particularly in complex, interconnected digital environments. These are risks, not inevitable results of every AI-enabled cyber operation.
The civilian impact can extend beyond the system an operation is intended to affect. In its 2025 working paper, AI in the military domain, the ICRC says state and non-state actors use cyber operations during armed conflict to disable civilian infrastructure and systems or disrupt essential services, particularly civilian government services. Interconnections between digital systems can make spillover and unintended effects harder to contain.
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The ICRC’s concern is not limited to immediate service disruption. In a 26 September 2025 Security Council statement, its Chief Legal Officer, Cordula Droege, warned of risks to civilian infrastructure and escalation in interconnected environments, alongside the possibility of algorithmic detention decisions. The ICRC calls on states to deepen discussions and develop a common understanding of how IHL applies to, and restricts, cyber operations.
How does international law apply to AI in war?
Existing IHL applies to military uses of AI; AI does not create a legal vacuum. The ICRC says the people using a weapon remain responsible for fulfilling obligations governing the conduct of hostilities. The fact that a system is automated does not, on its own, establish that its use is lawful or unlawful: the relevant issue is whether its use and effects can be brought within applicable legal obligations.
The ICRC has separately urged states to negotiate a binding international instrument on autonomous weapons. That is a recommendation for new rules, not a statement that the proposed rules are already binding law. The ICRC’s 2025 working paper similarly calls for a common understanding of IHL’s application to cyber operations rather than claiming that IHL does not apply.
Is there an international treaty regulating autonomous weapons?
The ICRC is advocating a new legally binding instrument, but the proposal should not be mistaken for an adopted treaty. In its current FAQ, the ICRC describes the Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), scheduled for 16–20 November 2026, as a critical opportunity for states to launch negotiations. That is a scheduled opportunity, not a reported negotiation outcome or an agreement.
What the ICRC proposes
- Prohibit autonomous weapons whose effects cannot be adequately predicted or controlled.
- Prohibit autonomous weapons designed or used to target humans directly.
- Restrict other autonomous weapons by limiting target types, geographic scope, duration, situations, and scale of use.
These proposed prohibitions and restrictions reflect the ICRC’s recommended approach. The cited material does not establish a comprehensive account of which governments support or oppose particular treaty language.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.How do NATO’s responsible-use principles compare with the ICRC proposal?
NATO’s framework and the ICRC’s recommendation address different questions and have different legal status. NATO’s 2021 AI strategy sets out principles for responsible use of AI across applications and lifecycles. The ICRC is calling for a binding instrument focused on autonomous weapons. The principles are not a substitute for a treaty, and the proposal is not existing law.
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| Approach | Legal status and scope | What it addresses |
|---|---|---|
| NATO Principles of Responsible Use, 2021 | Alliance policy principles; apply across AI applications and lifecycles. NATO says they do not supersede existing national or international obligations. | Lawfulness; responsibility and accountability; explainability and traceability; reliability; governability; and bias mitigation. |
| ICRC proposed instrument | Recommendation for a new legally binding international instrument focused on autonomous weapons; not adopted law. | Prohibitions based on unpredictability or direct targeting of humans, plus operational restrictions on other autonomous weapons. |
NATO’s strategy also calls for appropriate cyber defences, secure data infrastructure, and protection against malicious uses of AI. Its current innovation page describes a Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board as a focal point for responsible AI governance. These are alliance policies and institutional arrangements, not international legal rules binding on all states.
What should readers watch next?
The key near-term milestone identified by the ICRC is the Seventh CCW Review Conference, scheduled for 16–20 November 2026. Whether states launch negotiations, and what any resulting text contains, must be judged from developments at and after the conference; a scheduled meeting alone does not establish an outcome.
Across autonomous weapons, decision-support, and cyber capabilities, the practical governance questions remain distinct: can effects be anticipated and controlled; can humans make and own consequential decisions; can operations be limited in target, place, time, circumstances, and scale; and can civilian risks be reduced in complex systems? Existing IHL remains the legal baseline described by the ICRC, while the debate over additional rules continues.
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