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eBPF can help secure Linux by running verified programs at kernel hook points, where they can observe events, filter data, and—in supported tools and configurations—take action such as blocking activity. It is not a complete security system by itself, nor does it automatically replace every host agent. The right tool depends on whether you need runtime threat detection, network and service visibility, or application instrumentation.

What eBPF does in Linux security

eBPF is a virtual-machine-like facility that lets Linux run verified programs at selected points in the kernel. Depending on the program type and attachment point, a program can record information, modify it, make a decision, or trigger a side effect. The Linux kernel’s BPF documentation and the eBPF documentation describe the available program types, maps, pinning, and capabilities; Cilium also describes eBPF’s use in networking, tracing, and security, including sandboxing.

For security, the key advantage is proximity to the event. Programs can inspect activity such as process execution, system calls, file access, and network I/O as it occurs. A tool may filter or react to selected events in the kernel instead of sending every event to a user-space collector first. That can reduce the volume of data passed to user space and enable timely enforcement, but it does not guarantee lower overhead in every workload or make a system immune to tampering.

What eBPF can see and do depends on the program type, kernel, attachment point, permissions, and tool configuration. “Uses eBPF” therefore does not, by itself, tell you which events a product covers or whether it can block them.

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How to choose an eBPF security tool

Compare tools by the events they cover, the actions they can take, the identity they attach to events, where filtering occurs, and the privileges and kernel features they require. The projects below serve different purposes; they are not interchangeable implementations of one universal eBPF security agent.

Tool Best fit Signals and identity Action depth Important qualification
Tetragon Runtime security observability and enforcement Documents process execution, system-call activity, and file and network I/O. Designed to provide security context for Kubernetes workloads. Can filter and react in the kernel; supports runtime enforcement. Cilium’s Tetragon documentation describes it as eBPF-based security observability and runtime enforcement. Policy behavior depends on configuration.
Cilium and Hubble Network and service visibility Hubble provides identity-aware visibility for services and workloads on Cilium-managed networks. Primarily network visibility; do not treat Hubble as a replacement for a runtime process-enforcement tool. Cilium describes eBPF as enabling security visibility and control logic in Linux. Exact process, file, and syscall coverage is not stated in the cited Hubble description.
Falco Runtime event collection and detection Collects runtime events for detection; the cited documentation discusses its modern eBPF probe as an alternative driver. Exact Kubernetes identity fields are not stated in that description. Detection and alerting; kernel-level blocking capability is not stated in the cited documentation. Falco documentation identifies Linux 5.8 as the first kernel version with official support for its eBPF probe, while noting that distributions may backport support.
OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation (OBI) Application and network observability with controlled privileges Provides application and network instrumentation. Security-specific process, file, and syscall coverage is not stated in the cited OBI documentation. Observability and instrumentation; runtime blocking is not stated in the cited documentation. OBI documents interfaces for reading /proc, loading eBPF programs, and managing network-interface filters, with capabilities selected for the configuration.

Choose Tetragon for runtime enforcement

Tetragon is the clearest fit when the requirement is to observe security-relevant process, syscall, file, and network activity and apply filtering or reactions in the kernel. Its documentation describes “powerful realtime, eBPF-based Security Observability and Runtime Enforcement.” It is not a substitute for careful policy design: a rule that targets the wrong process or workload can disrupt legitimate activity.

Choose Cilium and Hubble for network and service visibility

Hubble is built on Cilium and eBPF as a distributed networking and security observability platform. Its distinguishing value is identity-aware visibility into services and workloads, which helps operators understand network behavior in Kubernetes environments. For process-level runtime detection or enforcement, pair that network perspective with a tool designed for those events rather than assuming Hubble provides the same coverage.

Choose Falco for event-driven detection

Falco is a runtime event collection and detection option. Its modern eBPF probe is one driver choice, not a guarantee that every supported kernel or distribution will expose identical behavior. The project identifies Linux 5.8 as the first version with official support for that probe and notes that some distributions backport support.

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Choose OBI for application and network instrumentation

OBI is relevant when the goal is application and network observability rather than general-purpose runtime enforcement. Its documentation describes the interfaces it needs and a design that uses only the capabilities required by the selected configuration. That narrower purpose can make it a better fit than a security enforcement tool when instrumentation is the primary need.

Kernel compatibility and permissions

Linux 5.8 is a useful compatibility marker, not a universal minimum version for all eBPF use. The Linux eBPF/Falco documentation identifies it as the first kernel version with official support for Falco’s modern eBPF probe. Linux 5.8 also marks the beginning of more granular eBPF capability classes in the capability documentation. Other program types, attachment points, tools, and distribution backports can change what works on a particular host.

Starting with Linux 5.8, the documented capability classes include:

  • CAP_BPF for loading programs and creating maps.
  • CAP_PERFMON for tracing operations.
  • CAP_NET_ADMIN for network programs.

These are examples, not a universal permission recipe. The required privileges depend on the tool and configuration. Running as root is the simplest setup, but OBI documents narrower capability sets for selected configurations. Before deployment, verify the kernel features and permissions required by the exact program and attachment points you intend to use; do not infer compatibility from the kernel version alone.

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Deploy policies without creating new risk

Kernel-level visibility and enforcement make scope and policy behavior important. Tetragon’s tracing-policy documentation warns that low-level policies require Linux-kernel and container knowledge and can behave unexpectedly, including through time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) issues, if configured incorrectly.

  1. Start with the signal you need. Decide whether the goal is process or file activity, syscall detection, network flow visibility, or application telemetry. Choose a tool whose documented coverage matches that need.
  2. Confirm host compatibility and permissions. Check the actual distribution kernel, backports, program types, attachment points, and capabilities required by the selected configuration.
  3. Test policies in observation mode where available. Review which workloads and events match before enabling blocking or other disruptive reactions.
  4. Roll out in stages. Apply changes to a limited set of hosts or workloads, monitor expected and unexpected effects, then expand deliberately.
  5. Keep a recovery path. Ensure operators can identify, revise, or disable a mis-scoped policy if it interferes with legitimate activity.

eBPF is a useful layer, not an unbreakable boundary. Cilium’s threat model recommends runtime security such as Tetragon for detecting container compromise, while also describing limits when an attacker has direct access to host namespaces or can disable the security components. Protecting the host and the security tooling remains part of the design.

Can eBPF replace security agents?

Sometimes it can reduce the amount of event collection that must happen in a separate user-space agent: a kernel program can filter or react to selected events before they are forwarded. That is different from proving that a particular deployment can eliminate its agents. Tools have distinct signal coverage, identity context, storage and alerting needs, and privilege requirements; an eBPF program also does not automatically provide the management, policy lifecycle, or response workflow a security team may need.

Decide based on required coverage and operational responsibilities, not on the presence of eBPF alone. A deployment may use kernel-side filtering alongside user-space components, or use different tools for runtime security, network visibility, and application instrumentation.

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Practical choice by security goal

  • Runtime process, syscall, file, or network enforcement: evaluate Tetragon.
  • Kubernetes network and service visibility with workload identity: evaluate Cilium and Hubble.
  • Runtime event-driven detection: evaluate Falco and verify eBPF-probe support for the host kernel and distribution.
  • Application and network instrumentation with configuration-dependent privileges: evaluate OBI.

No common authoritative adoption statistic or cross-project performance benchmark is established by the official materials cited here. Treat overhead as workload- and configuration-dependent, and measure it in your own environment rather than assuming that in-kernel collection is free or universally faster.

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