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The United States and China are competing in quantum computing, communications and sensing, but public evidence does not show that quantum technology has already transformed combat. The stakes are strategic: future systems could threaten some encryption, improve certain kinds of measurement and navigation, or change how secure keys are exchanged. Those possibilities are at different stages of development, and there is no supported single winner across all three fields.
Is there a U.S.-China quantum arms race?
There is a real competition over technologies with potential military and intelligence uses, though “arms race” can suggest a clearer contest and more mature weapons than the public record establishes. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission describes China as the leader in quantum communications and a rising competitor in computing and sensing. It characterizes the United States as the current frontrunner in quantum sensing priorities identified by the Department of Defense (DOD). These are the Commission’s assessments, not a definitive league table or proof of operational military superiority.
The distinction matters because quantum technology is not one capability. Computing, communications and sensing use different physical systems, solve different problems and face different technical barriers. A lead in one does not establish a lead in the others.
Where the two countries stand
| Field | What public assessments say | What that does—and does not—show |
|---|---|---|
| Quantum communications | The Commission reports that China leads and points to initiatives including the Beijing–Shanghai backbone and the Micius satellite program. | Infrastructure and demonstrations show progress, but do not by themselves establish a broadly deployed, secure military capability. Quantum key distribution still faces constraints on scale and infrastructure. |
| Quantum computing | Both countries invest in and publish research; the Commission describes China as a rising competitor. | Public benchmark results and qubit counts do not establish a machine capable of breaking modern public-key cryptography or prove a military advantage. Public information also cannot settle the status of undisclosed programs. |
| Quantum sensing | The Commission says experts consider the United States the current frontrunner in DOD-priority sensing. | Sensing spans different technologies and uses, so a national ranking is difficult to reduce to one measure. The assessment does not prove that a particular system is deployed in combat. |
| Research organization | The U.S. approach is spread across agencies, companies and universities; China’s is more state-directed and coordinated. | The Commission credits China’s model with tangible progress but says limited data sharing and private-sector participation make the maturity and sustainability of its efforts hard to judge. |
How quantum technology could affect warfare
Computing could put some encryption at risk
A sufficiently capable future quantum computer could break some public-key cryptographic systems. That would matter to governments and militaries that depend on encryption for communications and stored information. One concern is “harvest now, decrypt later”: an adversary could collect encrypted data today in hopes of deciphering it if a suitable machine becomes available in the future.
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That is a future risk, not a description of what today’s quantum computers can do. In a 2024 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) relayed expert estimates that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer might emerge in 10 to 20 years. This is an estimate range, not a firm deadline or guaranteed forecast.
Post-quantum cryptography is a practical defensive transition
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) means cryptographic algorithms designed to resist attacks from quantum computers. Unlike a quantum computer, PQC runs on conventional computing equipment. Moving to it is therefore a systems-modernization and migration challenge, not a weapon that depends on building a quantum machine.
The Commission says U.S. efforts have focused on PQC and quantum networking, and that PQC is preferred over quantum key distribution (QKD) for protecting communications and data. The distinction is important: PQC changes the cryptographic methods used by ordinary systems, while QKD is a separate approach to exchanging keys.
Quantum communications may offer new ways to exchange keys
QKD uses quantum properties to support secure key exchange. It is not a universal replacement for conventional secure communications: the Commission identifies hardware and infrastructure limits, as well as low error tolerance, as obstacles to scaling. Quantum networks exist, but remain limited in size and need further development.
China’s communications infrastructure is strategically notable, but a network demonstration or backbone is not on its own evidence that secure quantum communications are broadly fielded for military use.
Quantum sensing could improve measurement in difficult conditions
Quantum sensing research seeks more precise measurements. Military-relevant possibilities include improved navigation or detection in environments where existing approaches are difficult to use. The Commission describes U.S. sensing work as diverse and reports that experts see the United States as the current frontrunner in DOD-priority sensing.
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Those are potential applications, not evidence that quantum sensors have already changed battlefield navigation, surveillance or targeting. Specific effects depend on the sensor, its maturity and the conditions in which it can operate.
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What is established—and what remains prospective
- Established in public reporting: both countries are pursuing quantum research and infrastructure, and official assessments identify field-specific strengths and competition.
- A credible future concern: a sufficiently capable quantum computer could threaten some public-key cryptography, which makes migration to resistant methods a present planning issue.
- Not established by public evidence cited here: that current quantum computers can broadly decrypt military traffic, that QKD has replaced conventional secure communications, or that quantum systems have already transformed combat operations.
In 2025, the Commission wrote that “Quantum technologies—spanning computing, sensing, and communication—will shape the future of strategic advantage.” That is a statement about future strategic importance, not a finding that an operational transformation has already occurred.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What the U.S. strategy challenge looks like
Competition depends on more than laboratory breakthroughs: governments also need to coordinate programs, measure progress and move research into usable systems. In a March 18, 2026 report, GAO said federal agencies collectively spend about $200 million annually on quantum-computing activities. That figure covers quantum-computing activities, not total U.S. quantum spending or military spending, and it is not directly comparable to a foreign national spending total.
GAO also found that the U.S. national quantum-computing strategy needs stronger performance measures, more detail about future resources, clearer agency roles and better-integrated implementation. Those planning weaknesses do not mean the United States lacks quantum programs or research strength; they point to coordination and accountability gaps in turning activity into a coherent strategy.
Quick Recap
What to watch next
- Whether governments and organizations make measurable progress migrating sensitive systems to PQC, rather than treating the quantum threat as a distant problem.
- Whether quantum networks overcome cost, hardware and error-tolerance limits sufficiently to scale beyond limited deployments.
- Whether sensing research produces systems that work reliably in military-relevant conditions, rather than only demonstrating precision in controlled settings.
- Whether national strategies clarify who is responsible for delivery and how progress and resources will be assessed.
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