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The U.S.-led coalition has completed its withdrawal from Iraq and ended its Operation Inherent Resolve mission there, but that does not mean all U.S. security cooperation has stopped. Meanwhile, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s September 21, 2026 announcement that Kurdish armed factions had merged into one structure is a major political step—not proof that the Peshmerga already operate under a single, effective command. A U.S. oversight report published in 2026 documented continuing party control, gaps in command arrangements, and readiness and sustainment problems.
What changed when U.S. forces left Iraq?
On September 30, 2026, the United States announced the completion of its withdrawal from Iraq and the formal end of Operation Inherent Resolve in the country. The coalition mission against ISIL began in 2014, after Iraqi authorities invited a smaller U.S.-led mission back following ISIL’s seizure of large areas, according to the Associated Press.
The change is from a coalition wartime mission to Iraqi-led security—not necessarily from U.S. involvement to none. Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell told the AP that the United States would continue targeted training and intelligence support for Iraqi partners as part of a more normal bilateral security relationship. The scope and terms of that relationship, including what support will reach the Kurdistan Region, are not settled by the withdrawal announcement.
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What the KRG announced
On September 21, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani announced that Kurdish armed factions had merged into a unified structure. He described the goal as “one force, one ministry, and one command,” with a Peshmerga that is a national force, free from party interference. The announcement is a significant political and institutional milestone, as Al Jazeera reported.
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What operational integration requires
A merger announcement does not by itself establish who can issue orders across units, whether those orders will be followed, or whether forces can plan and sustain operations together. In its report covering July 1–December 31, 2025, the U.S. Lead Inspector General found that no agreement had been reached on overarching area commands. Without those commands, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs’ operations center could not command and control units, according to the 2026 report.
The report counted 84,923 personnel under Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs command as of November 2025. That was not the total Kurdish force: tens of thousands remained under the control of structures aligned with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The distinction matters because institutional unity depends not only on how many personnel are listed under the ministry, but also on whether party-linked forces are brought into a common chain of command.
How ready are the Peshmerga to operate together?
Readiness claims and validation
Ministry spokesperson Major General Othman Mohammed told Al Jazeera that the Peshmerga “has always been on full alert,” citing its role in repelling ISIL in 2014 despite limited means. That is the ministry’s assessment. The Inspector General’s later-dated account gives a more mixed picture of institutional readiness: as of November 2025, four divisions had reached full operating capability and three had reached initial operating capability, while two divisions did not achieve full operating capability in validation exercises.
Training, sustainment, and pay
The Inspector General also warned that limited professional military education could undermine complex operations. Newly formed divisions could lose capability without adequate resources and sustainment training, and the ministry lacked a viable sustainment plan without Coalition and Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund support. The report said that support was planned to decrease in fiscal year 2026, including the end of Peshmerga stipends, while Erbil and Baghdad remained at odds over salaries.
These findings do not establish that the Peshmerga cannot respond to threats. They do show why an announced merger and an official “full alert” claim are not substitutes for tested command arrangements, training, and dependable funding.
What security risks does the withdrawal leave?
Air defense and situational awareness
The Kurdistan Region’s Peshmerga Ministry expressed concern about the U.S. departure “under these complex regional circumstances, without the provision of a defense system,” in a statement quoted by the AP. The American University School of International Service’s Global Kurdish Initiative described the post-withdrawal posture as ground-centric Peshmerga forces, limited counter-drone kits, and air defense around key sites. These are reported assessments; they do not prove that the region has no defensive capability.
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The ministry also reported more than 1,000 drone and ballistic-missile attacks during the recent U.S.–Iran conflict, according to the AP. That is the ministry’s count as quoted by the outlet, not an independently verified tally. The concerns about air defense and situational awareness reflect a broader issue than troop numbers: forces may need to detect, assess, and coordinate responses to threats as well as defend against them.
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Coordination with federal Iraqi forces
With the coalition’s previous operational role ended, Iraqi forces carry greater responsibility for security against ISIL remnants and other threats. Al Jazeera reported that Kurdish and Iraqi security-force commanders had cooperated and coordinated. Whether that coordination can cover the needs of the post-coalition period depends on working arrangements between federal Iraqi forces and the Kurdistan Region; the mission’s end alone does not settle how future incidents will be handled.
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Why do the KDP–PUK divide and Baghdad relations matter?
The KDP and PUK are not just political parties with separate constituencies; their influence over forces is a practical obstacle to a unified military chain of command. Al Jazeera reported continuing disputes between the parties over governance in the Kurdistan Region and relations with Baghdad, and quoted analysts warning that these tensions could affect military institutions if forces remain tied to party structures. The challenge is whether unification can take hold while geographically distinct commands and party loyalties persist.
Erbil says it intends to continue cooperating with Baghdad within Iraq’s federal framework. Dialogue, legal processes, and security coordination are important conditions for managing that relationship, but available reporting does not establish that future political disputes or security incidents will be resolved.
Will U.S. security support for the Peshmerga continue?
The end of Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq is distinct from the end of all security cooperation. The AP reported the Pentagon’s description of a transition to an Iraqi-led effort with targeted training and intelligence support for Iraqi partners. That statement describes the broader bilateral relationship; it does not specify which Peshmerga units will receive support or define the form, scale, or duration of assistance to the Kurdistan Region.
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Repair common Windows errors and clear accumulated junk for a smoother, more stable PC - no reinstall needed.Free scan · no reinstallU.S.–KRG security arrangements had supported Peshmerga reform and unification since 2016, with an updated four-year agreement in 2022, according to The National. Before the withdrawal was completed, KRG officials told the newspaper that expiry of the existing agreement should not be read as the end of the strategic partnership. They expected training, advice, logistics, institutional reform, and capacity-building could continue and said a new framework might be discussed. Those were KRG officials’ expectations, not final terms or a guarantee that every form of assistance will continue.
What will determine the next phase?
The Peshmerga’s post-withdrawal position will depend on whether the KRG’s political pledge becomes an enforceable military structure, whether Erbil and Baghdad can coordinate security, and what bilateral U.S. support actually provides. The September merger announcement marks a new phase; the late-2025 oversight findings show why its success should be judged by command authority, reduced party control, validated readiness, and the ability to sustain forces—not by the announcement alone.
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