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Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates use sport as a portfolio of visibility and relationship-building tools: they host major events, sponsor teams and competitions, invest in clubs and leagues, and channel capital through state-linked funds. The strategy can put a country and its institutions in front of international audiences, connect them with sports bodies and business partners, and support tourism or domestic development. Those are intended benefits and plausible mechanisms—not proof that investment alone changes public opinion or creates lasting soft power.
What does sports investment have to do with soft power?
Soft power is the ability to attract or persuade rather than compel. Sport can contribute to it because popular teams and high-profile events reach audiences across borders, while the business of sport creates recurring contact among governments, organizers, sponsors, athletes, visitors and media.
The investment can take several forms, each with a different route to influence:
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- Hosting events: A tournament or recurring race gives a host country international exposure and brings visitors and sports organizations into the country.
- Owning clubs or competitions: State-linked ownership places capital inside recognizable institutions that receive regular coverage.
- Developing leagues and recruiting athletes: A stronger domestic competition can attract talent and audiences, build local sports activity and raise the country’s profile.
- Sponsoring teams and events: Brand placement links a country or state-linked company to broadcasts, competitions and commercial networks.
- Investing through sovereign wealth funds: Funds can acquire sports assets as part of wider portfolios that also span media, tourism, culture and other sectors.
These channels can overlap. A country may host an event, sponsor its participants and use the exposure to support tourism ambitions. In a 2024 article in American Behavioral Scientist, Jonathan Grix and Paul Michael Brannagan analyze mega-events as tools of foreign policy and sports diplomacy; a 2022 comparative study by Vitas Rafael Carosella likewise treats football as a means through which Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia seek international standing. These accounts describe strategy and possible mechanisms, not a common measure of how much public attitudes changed.
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How do Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE differ?
The three states use overlapping tools, but accounts of their strategies emphasize different goals. The distinctions below are emphases, not exclusive explanations for any investment.
| State | Examples and instruments | Emphasis described by sources | Evidence and qualification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qatar | Hosted the men’s 2022 FIFA World Cup; Qatar Sports Investments (QSI) acquired Paris Saint-Germain in 2011; Qatar Airways has sponsored major sports properties. | Global visibility, tourism and international standing. Academic analysis also interprets football as a way to support Qatar’s position and security amid regional disputes. | Carosella’s 2022 study and Grix and Brannagan’s 2024 article discuss these aims and mechanisms. They do not establish a measured, durable improvement in foreign opinion. |
| Saudi Arabia | The Public Investment Fund (PIF) acquired Newcastle United in 2021, helped expand the Saudi football league, funded LIV Golf, and backed hosting ambitions including the 2034 men’s FIFA World Cup. | Vision 2030 diversification, international profile, domestic participation and competition with neighboring states. | BBC Sport reported the government’s stated objectives and criticism of the strategy in 2023. PwC Middle East’s 2025 outlook reported Saudi Arabia’s selection as 2034 host. Funding and sponsorship arrangements can change: AP reported on 14 May 2026 that PIF became a FIFA World Cup tournament supporter and said it would stop future funding for LIV Golf; the value of the World Cup partnership was not disclosed. |
| United Arab Emirates | Football investment and broader state-linked fund portfolios, including Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala; SWP Berlin reports a 2025 investment in TWG Global, a platform with stakes in major US sports franchises and Chelsea FC. | Positioning the UAE, particularly as described in the 2022 comparative study, as an international travel and business hub. | Carosella’s 2022 study connects football investment to hub-building. SWP Berlin’s 2026 analysis places sports-related holdings within wider portfolio activity; this is not evidence that a single investment caused a particular soft-power outcome. |
The comparison also reflects different scales and instruments: Qatar’s World Cup is a completed hosting example, Saudi Arabia’s 2034 tournament is a future hosting commitment, and the UAE examples include portfolio investment as well as football. These are not like-for-like measures of success.
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Why invest in sport beyond international visibility?
Tourism and economic diversification
Events can bring visitors and give hosts a platform to present attractions, hospitality and infrastructure. For Qatar, academic accounts link sports events to tourism and showcasing leisure and cultural offerings. For Saudi Arabia, BBC Sport reported that officials present sport as part of an effort to grow tourism, create jobs and diversify the economy beyond oil. These are stated aims; they should not be confused with measured returns from a particular event or acquisition.
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Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesFind Drivers →Clear out junk files and repair common Windows errorsFree Scan →PwC Middle East’s Sports Industry Outlook 2025, published 9 April 2025, forecasts Saudi Arabia’s sports market to grow from $8 billion to $22.4 billion by 2030. This is a forecast, not an observed 2030 result. The same report says Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds lead 24% of global sports investments; the figure describes the report’s assessment of investment share, not a soft-power score or a country-by-country breakdown.
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Domestic participation, jobs and infrastructure
Sport can also serve residents, not only overseas audiences. BBC Sport reported the Saudi government’s stated aim of encouraging exercise among a youthful population and expanding opportunities and jobs. PwC’s 2025 outlook characterizes 50% of the GCC population as under 25; that is a regional demographic figure, not a measure of sports participation. A domestic league or event infrastructure may support local activity, but international visibility does not by itself show whether access, participation or employment improved.
Diplomatic ties and regional competition
Sport creates repeated contact with international governing bodies, clubs, sponsors and commercial partners. It can make a country a more prominent participant in global sports networks and, as the comparative research suggests, give governments an avenue for diplomatic relevance and security. Saudi Arabia’s expansion is also described in the sources in the context of competition with neighboring states. Such interpretations can coexist with commercial or domestic-policy motives; they should not be treated as proof of a single hidden purpose.
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Why is Saudi Arabia spending so much on sport?
Saudi Arabia’s strategy is especially associated with Vision 2030 and PIF. Its investments span club ownership, league development, international athletes, events and sponsorship. The government’s stated case, as reported by BBC Sport in 2023, is that sport can encourage exercise, open the country to the international community, attract tourism, create jobs and help diversify the economy. BBC Sport also reported a Saudi sports minister’s estimate of £5 billion invested over the preceding three years; that is the minister’s estimate as reported in 2023, not an audited total or a comparable figure for the other states.
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The PIF’s World Cup relationship and its announced withdrawal from future LIV Golf funding illustrate why individual commitments need dates. AP reported both developments on 14 May 2026 and quoted the fund describing sport as a “priority sector” and soccer as crucial to the “ongoing transformation of Saudi Arabia.” Those are PIF’s words as reported by AP, not an independent assessment of the effect of its investments.
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What does “sportswashing” mean, and what are the criticisms?
“Sportswashing” is a critical label for the argument that investment in sport can improve or normalize a country’s image while drawing attention away from concerns about rights or governance. It is contested, and it should not be presented as a proven, single explanation for every sports investment.
Critics cited by BBC Sport have raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s human-rights record, migrant workers, free speech and environmental effects. The report says Saudi authorities reject the sportswashing accusation and frame sport as part of Vision 2030; Saudi sports minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Turki Al Faisal called the claims “very shallow.” Qatar’s 2022 World Cup also faced criticism over migrant-worker treatment and rights, as discussed in academic analysis by Grix and Brannagan. A balanced account distinguishes these criticisms and responses from the separate question of whether a specific investment achieved its stated economic or diplomatic aims.
The language itself reflects the disagreement. In a 2023 BBC Sport report, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said: “If sportswashing is going to increase my GDP by 1%, then we’ll continue doing sportswashing.” The remark was made in the context of criticism; it does not independently verify a GDP effect. Amnesty International UK’s Felix Jakens, also quoted by BBC Sport, argued that high-profile sports acquisitions were as much about sportswashing as economic contribution. That is an attributed criticism, not a measured finding about the effect of each investment.
Does sports investment prove that a country has gained soft power?
No single event, sponsorship or acquisition proves that it has. Investment can create exposure, relationships and opportunities, but exposure is not the same as attraction, and a diplomatic or commercial connection is not by itself evidence of a lasting change in public opinion. The sources discussed here provide no comparable causal estimate of soft-power gains across Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
It is also possible for one investment to pursue several goals at once: commercial returns, tourism, domestic policy, diversification, diplomatic ties, regional competition and reputation management. The most defensible conclusion is therefore about strategy: these states use sport to build visibility and networks while pursuing wider economic and political aims. Whether that activity produces durable soft power must be assessed separately from the scale of the spending or the audience for an event.
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