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Organizations should begin preparing for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) now—not because anyone knows when a quantum computer will break today’s public-key cryptography, but because replacing cryptography across complex systems takes time and sensitive data may need to stay secret for years. NIST has finalized three PQC standards and says quantum-vulnerable algorithms will be deprecated and ultimately removed from its standards by 2035. That is a standards-transition target, not a forecast for when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer will arrive.
Why prepare for post-quantum cryptography now?
PQC is the standards-and-migration response to the future risk that sufficiently capable quantum computers could defeat some public-key cryptography in use today. The concern is specific: it does not mean that quantum computing breaks all cryptography. NIST says no one knows when a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) will be built, and predictions vary. The case for action rests instead on migration lead time and the useful life of protected data.
NIST notes that new algorithms can take 10 to 20 years to become fully integrated into information systems. This is a general historical estimate, not a measured PQC migration duration or a prediction about quantum hardware. Organizations also need to account for “harvest now, decrypt later”: an adversary could collect encrypted data today and retain it in the hope of decrypting it in the future. Data with a long confidentiality requirement can therefore be exposed to a future capability even if it cannot be decrypted today. NIST explains the rationale for acting before a CRQC exists.
What do the finalized NIST standards do?
On August 13, 2024, the Secretary of Commerce approved three Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for post-quantum cryptography. They cover two different cryptographic jobs: establishing shared secret keys and creating digital signatures. NIST’s announcement identifies the approved standards.
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| Standard | Algorithm | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber | Establishes a shared secret key over a public channel. |
| FIPS 204 | Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium | Creates digital signatures for integrity checking and signer authentication. |
| FIPS 205 | Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA), derived from SPHINCS+ | Creates digital signatures for integrity checking and signer authentication. |
Key establishment and signatures are not interchangeable. ML-KEM addresses establishing a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA address signatures. When planning a transition, organizations need to identify which cryptographic function each system uses rather than treating “PQC” as a single replacement algorithm. The NIST NCCoE migration FAQ provides further guidance on the standards and migration questions.
What does NIST’s 2035 target mean?
NIST’s current PQC project page says it plans to deprecate and ultimately remove quantum-vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035, with high-risk systems transitioning earlier. This is a target for the transition of cryptographic standards—not a prediction that a CRQC will exist by 2035. NIST’s IR 8547 transition report is listed as an initial public draft published November 12, 2024; its comment period closed January 10, 2025. It should not be described as a final report. Follow current publications and applicable government or sector requirements as they evolve.
Sources: NIST PQC project page and NIST CSRC listing for the IR 8547 initial public draft.
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1Clear out junk files and repair common Windows errors2Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute3Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsHow should an organization start its PQC migration?
Treat the transition as an organization-wide technology and risk-management project. NIST’s migration FAQ and a joint CISA, NSA, and NIST readiness factsheet support a sequence that begins with visibility and prioritization, then moves into planning and system changes.
- Inventory cryptographic use. Identify where public-key cryptography and related assets appear across applications, protocols, libraries, certificates, keys, and dependent hardware or services. Map dependencies so the organization can see which systems rely on which cryptographic components. NIST’s migration FAQ discusses centralized inventory as a starting point for tracking PQC work.
- Assess impact and prioritize. Consider business criticality, information sensitivity, and how long data must remain confidential. Give attention to high-value data with long secrecy lifetimes, since collected ciphertext could be targeted later. NIST’s PQC explainer describes the harvest-now-decrypt-later concern.
- Build a roadmap and engage vendors. Set migration priorities, record dependencies, and contact vendors early about product, service, protocol, and hardware updates. The joint CISA, NSA, and NIST quantum-readiness factsheet outlines readiness actions. It was published in 2023, before the 2024 standards were finalized, so use it for general preparation rather than as the current status of the standards.
- Evaluate interoperability and performance. Test how updated components work with systems and partners in scope, including the effects of replacing or combining cryptographic mechanisms. NIST’s NCCoE migration project includes interoperability and benchmarking as workstreams; coordinate this evaluation with vendors and system owners.
- Track the standards and requirements that apply. Use the finalized FIPS standards and monitor current NIST publications, corrections, and relevant sector or government requirements. Do not base an implementation plan on an outdated expectation that the initial standards are still forthcoming.
What should technology leaders communicate?
Make clear that the timeline for migration is not a quantum-computer countdown. NIST’s target to remove vulnerable algorithms from its standards by 2035 is a standards policy milestone, while the date a CRQC might be built remains unknown. The practical message is to discover exposure, prioritize data and systems by risk, and plan updates with suppliers before a future capability makes delay costly. As NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who leads its PQC standardization project, put it: “We encourage organizations to begin their transition to these standards immediately to ensure their data remains secure in the quantum era.” The statement appears in NIST’s PQC explainer.
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