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In March 2023, cybersecurity firm Intezer reported a phishing campaign targeting people in China’s nuclear-energy industry, as well as some academics connected to the field. The emails impersonated the Kyrgyzstan Embassy in China and used conference invitations to deliver malicious files. Intezer attributed the activity to Bitter APT based on similarities in tactics and techniques; the reporting does not establish an official government attribution or show that nuclear facilities or operational systems were compromised.

What happened in the reported campaign?

Intezer’s March 24, 2023 analysis identified seven phishing emails themed around the Kyrgyzstan Embassy in China. The messages invited recipients to conferences on nuclear-related topics and used diplomatic and technical details to appear credible. Recipients were encouraged to open a RAR archive containing either a Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file or an Excel file. Intezer’s technical analysis described the delivery chain; SecurityWeek’s March 28, 2023 coverage summarized the findings.

How did the phishing attachments work?

The observed files attempted to establish scheduled tasks and retrieve or run later malware. The precise behavior differed by attachment and variant.

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Excel files

The Excel documents used an Equation Editor exploit. One observed file attempted to create a scheduled task to download a subsequent executable; another attempted to run that executable. Intezer also noted that updated first-stage payloads included additional obfuscation and decoys.

CHM files

The CHM files also created scheduled tasks and fetched later payloads. One variant used msiexec to run a remote MSI installer, while another used an encoded PowerShell command. These actions describe attempted malware delivery, not evidence that every recipient’s computer was successfully infected.

What is known about the impact?

Intezer said it did not retrieve further payloads from the command-and-control servers. In some cases, researchers received empty MSI files and could infer filenames of possible later stages. The report therefore does not confirm what additional malware, if any, was successfully delivered in this campaign.

Intezer mentioned possible keyloggers, remote-access tools, file stealers, and browser-credential stealers by reference to payloads associated with earlier Bitter activity. Those capabilities were not confirmed as delivered in this operation. The reviewed reporting does not establish a victim count, confirmed data theft, compromise of a nuclear facility, or disruption of operations. It concerns email recipients and malware delivery attempts; it does not report compromise of reactors, operational technology, or safety systems.

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Who did researchers say was behind it?

Intezer attributed the activity to Bitter APT because the campaign’s tactics, techniques, and procedures resembled activity previously attributed to that group. Intezer described Bitter as a South Asian threat group that commonly targets energy and government organizations. This is a researcher attribution based on behavioral similarities, not an official government attribution.

A 2025 CISA advisory on other PRC-linked operations provides broader context on state-sponsored activity and cautions that commercial threat-group names may not map one-to-one to government groupings. It does not establish a connection between those operations and the 2023 Bitter-attributed campaign.

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What should organizations take away?

The lure relied on a plausible diplomatic identity and a subject relevant to recipients’ work. Intezer security researcher Ryan Robinson advised: “Always verify that the sender is trusted and understand that even if it claims to be from a particular person, it might not be.”

  • Verify unexpected diplomatic or conference invitations through a trusted contact method rather than relying on the sender name, signature, or subject matter.
  • Treat unexpected archives and CHM files as suspicious; Intezer specifically cautioned against opening CHM attachments.
  • Make it easy for staff to report suspicious email so security teams can investigate it.

These steps address the observed lure and delivery methods, but the report does not test or guarantee the effectiveness of any particular control.

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