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Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minuteDriver Scan →Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsFix Now →Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesFind Drivers →Russian electronic warfare (EW) looked less decisive in the opening phase of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine than its prewar reputation suggested. It became more consequential as the war settled into attritional, positional fighting—not because Russia suddenly gained control of the spectrum, but because it could apply jamming, interception and counter-drone effects repeatedly on a battlefield where both sides relied heavily on electronic systems. Russia’s post-2008 military reforms had built EW into combined-arms forces; the war then exposed both the value of that investment and its limits in mobility, coordination, supply and adaptation.
What electronic warfare does on a battlefield
Electronic warfare is not simply radio jamming. It involves finding and interpreting signals, disrupting an opponent’s use of the spectrum, and protecting one’s own operations from similar interference. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) describes three overlapping functions: surveillance, attack and defence. Its 2025 paper says that “Electronic warfare has shifted from being a niche force multiplier to become an all-arms concern.”
Surveillance: find and understand signals
EW surveillance detects and analyses adversary waveforms. That can help locate emitters, identify activity and inform other forces, including artillery and air defence. It is closely connected to signals intelligence (SIGINT), which gathers and interprets communications and other electronic emissions.
Attack: disrupt communications and navigation
Jamming can interfere with radio communications or satellite navigation such as GPS. Effects are often local and dependent on the target, frequency, equipment and conditions; a disrupted signal does not mean every device across a theatre has stopped working. CSIS identifies GPS interference, communications disruption, SIGINT and localized jamming of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as important features of the Ukraine war.
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Defence: make the opponent’s targeting harder
EW can also interfere with an adversary’s ability to detect, communicate, coordinate and deliver precision weapons. Disrupting a link or navigation signal can complicate a kill chain—the sequence from finding a target to engaging it—even when it does not destroy the weapon or platform itself.
Why Russian EW declined and was rebuilt
Post-Cold War priorities shifted
The “fall” in the title describes a broader decline in attention to high-end EW after the Cold War, not a single collapse of Russian capability. Western militaries, focused for a period on counterterrorism and insurgency, also reduced emphasis on high-end EW planning. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) says that this reduced attention may have weakened such planning as great-power competition later returned to prominence.
Reforms after the 2008 Georgia war
Russia’s post-2008 modernization followed lessons from its war with Georgia. CRS describes the New Look Program, the formation of joint strategic commands, a large state armaments program and continuing changes to EW organizations. The aim was not merely to buy more specialist equipment: EW was treated as part of the larger command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) problem.
EW moved into the combined-arms structure
CRS reports close links among Russian SIGINT and EW units, air defence and artillery. It also reports that Russian motorized brigades received EW companies with more than 100 personnel, giving commanders access to spectrum effects at the tactical level as well as through larger formations.
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Military analyst Robert McDermott, quoted by CRS, characterized Russian EW as a “type of armed struggle using electronic means against enemy C4ISR to ‘change the quality of information,’ or using electronic means against various assets to change the condition of the operational environment.” The key idea is that EW can alter what a force can perceive and coordinate, not just silence a transmitter.
Why the 2022 invasion did not settle the question
The opening campaign was not the battlefield Russia expected
RUSI’s 2022 report Silicon Lifeline describes an invasion premised on a “surgical occupation” that instead became a grinding war of attrition. The campaign’s early course did not give Russia a simple opportunity to turn its EW inventory into a decisive, sustained advantage. EW is most useful when it is coordinated with the wider force, supported by reliable communications and applied to targets that can be identified and reached. Those conditions cannot be assumed in a fast-moving, contested campaign.
Organizational friction limited exploitation
CSIS points to Russia’s compartmentalized structure and weak trust between units as constraints on its ability to exploit information warfare fully. Having capable systems is not the same as integrating their effects quickly across units. EW also risks interfering with one’s own communications and operations, so coordination and disciplined use matter.
The spectrum stayed contested
CSIS describes a battlefield where interference helped prevent either side from maintaining air superiority, making rapid maneuver difficult and favoring positional warfare. That is not the same as saying EW alone caused the stalemate: it operated alongside other battlefield factors. Nor did either side hold a permanent spectrum advantage. Effects shifted as units changed tactics, equipment and countermeasures.
Why EW became more consequential in a protracted war
A static or slowly moving front gives forces more opportunity to observe recurring activity, position systems and apply effects repeatedly. The density of drones, radios and navigation-dependent systems also gives both sides more electronic activity to detect or disrupt. This helps explain why Russian EW could appear more effective in the grinding phase than in the opening campaign without implying that it had become omnipotent.
GPS disruption prompted alternatives
CSIS notes that GPS interference pushed operators toward alternatives such as inertial navigation, line-of-sight links, satellite communications, relay stations and mesh networks. None is a universal substitute: each changes the system’s dependencies and vulnerabilities. Inertial navigation can function without a live satellite signal but accumulates error; communications relays and mesh networks can provide alternate paths but still depend on functioning nodes and links.
Frequency agility complicates jamming
CSIS identifies Russian frequency-hopping agility as a relevant feature of the conflict. Changing frequencies can make a signal harder to track or disrupt, but it does not make communications immune to EW. The contest is adaptive: detection, jamming, software changes and operating procedures can all change what works.
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Counter-drone effects are local and situational
Localized UAV jamming can disrupt a drone’s control or navigation links, but its effects depend on the particular drone and its operating mode. A drone that loses one link may behave differently from one relying on another navigation or control method. This is why “counter-drone EW” should not be read as a blanket ability to stop all UAVs.
What the war reveals about Russian, Ukrainian and Western approaches
The evidence supports comparing approaches by force design and adaptation, rather than declaring one country’s EW universally superior. RUSI and CSIS point to five useful dimensions:
| Dimension | What to examine | What the available evidence establishes |
|---|---|---|
| Echelon | Whether capability sits in strategic complexes, larger formations or tactical units. | CRS reports Russian EW links to SIGINT, air defence and artillery, and brigade EW companies with more than 100 personnel. A directly comparable Ukrainian or Western personnel figure is not stated in the cited material. |
| Mobility and survivability | Whether systems can move, remain protected and continue operating under observation or attack. | The sources identify mobility and survivability as relevant force-design issues but do not provide a like-for-like comparative rating across Russian, Ukrainian and Western systems. |
| Function | How surveillance, attack and defence are combined. | RUSI sets out these three functions; CSIS describes Ukraine battlefield applications including SIGINT, communications and GPS disruption, and localized UAV jamming. |
| Adaptability | How quickly systems and operators can change frequencies, software or tactics. | CSIS identifies Russian frequency-hopping agility and highlights rapid countermeasure cycles as a battlefield lesson. The sources do not establish a single overall ranking of national adaptability. |
| Resilience | Whether forces can keep navigating and communicating when primary links are disrupted. | CSIS identifies inertial navigation, line-of-sight links, satellite communications, relay stations and mesh networks as alternatives used or pursued under GPS and communications interference. Each has distinct vulnerabilities. |
This framework helps distinguish capability from outcome. A force may field advanced equipment but struggle to coordinate it; another may compensate for disrupted links with alternate methods or faster changes in tactics. The war has been a contested-spectrum conflict, not a demonstration of permanent Russian, Ukrainian or Western control.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.The limits that temper Russia’s EW advantage
Dependence on advanced electronics
RUSI’s Silicon Lifeline examined components and operation in 27 modern Russian systems, including communications and EW complexes, and concluded that Russia’s dependence on Western electronics created a potential long-term vulnerability. That finding identifies a dependency; it does not by itself quantify the effect on every system or establish a uniform battlefield consequence.
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Coordination and trust
CSIS’s account of compartmentalization and weak inter-unit trust points to a persistent operational constraint: EW effects must be coordinated with the units they support and with other forces operating in the same spectrum. More equipment cannot by itself resolve organizational friction.
Countermeasures evolve
Jamming and interception are part of an ongoing cycle. Operators can alter frequencies, use different navigation methods, add communication paths or change procedures; EW units can then adapt their detection and attack methods. No single workaround is guaranteed to remain effective, and no single EW system makes a force immune.
How to read claims about Russian EW
Claims that Russian EW is either ineffective or dominant flatten a changing battlefield into a permanent verdict. A more accurate reading separates what the sources establish from what they do not:
Quick Recap
- Russia institutionalized EW through post-2008 modernization and connected it to SIGINT, air defence, artillery and C4ISR.
- EW has affected navigation, communications, UAV operations and the coordination of precision effects in Ukraine.
- Its value has been more visible in sustained positional fighting than in the invasion’s opening phase, but the spectrum remains contested.
- Russian effectiveness is constrained by organizational friction, dependence on Western electronics and the need to respond to rapid Ukrainian adaptation.
- The cited sources do not establish a permanent advantage for either side or a comparable ranking of Russian, Ukrainian and Western systems across all dimensions.
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