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Both, but their duties are different. Security or vulnerability management normally coordinates discovery, validation, risk assessment, prioritization, tracking and closure evidence. The engineering, operations or product team that controls the affected code, configuration or system performs the technical remediation. The service or risk owner supplies resources, approves exceptions and accepts residual risk only within delegated authority.

That division is a practical operating model, not a universal organization chart. CISA, NIST and OWASP guidance consistently point to assigned roles, documented policy and explicit handoffs rather than an assumption that one department owns every step.

Why vulnerability ownership is a shared responsibility

A vulnerability is a condition that could be exploited; fixing it is a change to software, configuration, infrastructure or operating practice. Those activities require different authority and skills. Security can determine how serious an exposure is, but it usually cannot safely modify an application it does not maintain. Engineering can change the application, but may not know which assets are exposed across the organization or how the change affects enterprise risk. A service owner understands business impact and availability commitments, yet may not have permission to alter code or accept unlimited risk.

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CISA’s CRR Supplemental Resource Guide: Vulnerability Management recommends a plan that defines monitoring, remediation and authorization roles. NIST’s Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) Version 1.1, published in February 2022, calls for organizations to assess, prioritize and remediate vulnerabilities and to establish the responsibilities and processes needed for response. The result is a chain of accountability: one function coordinates and verifies, another makes the change, and an authorized owner decides what risk the business will carry.

Who does what?

Role Primary responsibilities What this role normally does not own alone
Security or vulnerability management Monitor advisories and reports; validate whether an issue applies; assess exploitability and business impact; set or advise on priority under policy; assign and track work; communicate risk; verify evidence that a fix or mitigation worked. Writing application code, changing production infrastructure without the maintainer, or accepting residual risk beyond its delegated authority.
Engineering, operations or system maintainer Analyze the affected component; select a code, configuration or patch change; build and test it; prepare a release; deploy through change controls; document technical results and rollback steps. Unilaterally changing the organization’s risk tolerance or closing a finding without evidence.
Service, asset or system owner Ensure a responsible team and resources exist; set operational constraints; coordinate maintenance windows; approve business trade-offs; accept or escalate residual risk within delegated limits. Performing specialized remediation it does not control or silently waiving policy requirements.
Supplier or product maintainer Investigate a product defect, develop and communicate a correction, and provide release information or mitigations to customers. Deploying the update inside every customer environment or deciding the customer’s local exposure.

In a small company, one person may hold several rows. The controls still matter: the record should show who analyzed the issue, who made the change and who authorized any remaining risk.

What happens from report to closure?

The following workflow separates coordination from implementation while keeping a single accountable record.

  1. Record the report and affected assets. Capture the advisory or internal finding, component and version, environment, discovery date, evidence, and an initial contact. Assign a service or system owner even when applicability is not yet confirmed.
  2. Validate applicability. Security or the vulnerability-management function checks whether the vulnerable code or configuration is present, reachable and enabled. False positives, compensating controls and duplicate findings should be documented rather than simply deleted.
  3. Assess and communicate risk. Use the organization’s criteria for exploitability, exposure, data sensitivity, service criticality and available threat information. State assumptions and uncertainty. Security recommends a priority; the policy, not personal preference, determines how that priority maps to a target date.
  4. Design a correction or mitigation. The maintainer determines whether the answer is a vendor patch, code change, configuration adjustment, feature disablement, isolation, access restriction or another workaround. Engineering estimates testing, compatibility, downtime and rollback impact. If no safe permanent fix exists, record the interim control explicitly.
  5. Authorize the change. Use normal change management when practical. CISA guidance also calls for an emergency path for urgent corrective actions, with appropriate approval and post-change review. The change record should identify affected assets, test evidence, deployment scope and rollback criteria.
  6. Implement and test. Engineering or operations applies the correction in a controlled environment, tests security and functional behavior, and releases it to the required population. A patch installed on one server does not close a finding covering a fleet.
  7. Verify and close. Security, an independent tester or an agreed automated control checks the resulting version or configuration and, where relevant, confirms that exploit conditions are gone. Attach evidence, record the completion date and close only the assets actually remediated.
  8. Escalate missed dates. If the target cannot be met, the owner documents the reason, current exposure, interim safeguards, accountable approver, residual risk and a specific review date. The item remains open while the risk decision is active.

How quickly must a vulnerability be fixed?

There is no single deadline that applies to every organization or vulnerability. NIST SP 800-171 Revision 3, published in May 2024, leaves update timeframes organization-defined and notes that they can vary with factors such as the criticality of the update. CISA guidance calls for stakeholders to agree on remediation timeframes. A contract, law, regulator, customer commitment or internal standard may impose a specific clock; absent such a requirement, use a documented risk-based policy.

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A useful policy defines time bands by severity and exposure, then permits a shorter emergency path when active exploitation or critical business impact warrants it. It should also state when the clock starts (for example, validated applicability rather than the date an advisory first appeared), what counts as a temporary mitigation, who can extend a due date and how extensions are reviewed. Publishing a number without these conditions creates false precision: a low-risk library on an isolated development host is not equivalent to an exposed identity service, even if both receive the same severity label.

Who fixes a vulnerability in third-party software?

Separate the supplier’s product responsibility from the customer’s deployment responsibility. Under coordinated disclosure practices described in NIST SP 800-216 (May 24, 2023), the party maintaining the product may investigate, create and announce a correction. The organization using that product must determine where it is deployed, obtain the update, test it against local workloads and apply it or an approved mitigation. Its service owner remains responsible for local downtime, dependencies and residual exposure.

Contracts and intake procedures should provide a route for receiving vulnerability reports and supplier notices, identify who monitors that channel, and require enough detail to map a correction to product versions. When a supplier has not issued a fix, the customer can restrict exposure, disable an affected feature, isolate the system or increase monitoring while pressing for a correction. Those actions reduce local risk but do not transfer the customer’s deployment duty to the supplier.

How the answer changes by vulnerability type

In-house application code

The team maintaining the application generally owns the code change, tests and release. Security validates the finding, helps prioritize it, tracks the ticket and verifies that the vulnerable path is no longer exploitable. Product or service ownership coordinates customer impact and release timing.

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Operating-system, platform or infrastructure flaw

The supplier may produce the patch, while an infrastructure or platform team deploys it across images, hosts, containers or managed services. The service owner schedules downtime and confirms that dependent workloads remain supported. Security checks coverage rather than assuming that a patch announcement equals remediation.

Configuration weakness

The team with authority over the setting—cloud, network, database, identity or endpoint operations—makes the change and records the resulting state. Security advises on the risk and verifies that the intended control is effective. If a setting is constrained by a business dependency, the owner documents the exception and compensating controls.

No safe or available fix

Engineering and security should evaluate isolation, access reduction, feature disablement, filtering, additional monitoring or workload migration. An authorized owner then decides whether the remaining risk can be accepted under policy. Acceptance is a time-bounded governance decision, not evidence that the vulnerability was fixed.

Choosing among remediation options

When several actions are possible, compare them explicitly instead of selecting the easiest ticket to close.

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Decision factor Questions to ask
Risk reduction How much exploitability and potential impact does the option remove, and does it address the vulnerable condition or only limit access?
Time to deploy Can it be applied immediately, or does it require a full release, maintenance window or supplier cycle?
Breakage and compatibility Could the change interrupt service, alter interfaces, remove a required feature or conflict with supported versions?
Coverage Does the option protect every affected asset, including dormant, backup, test and geographically separate instances?
Reversibility Can the team roll back safely, and is rollback itself likely to restore the exposure?
Durability Is this a permanent correction, a temporary mitigation or a monitoring measure that requires a later decision?

CISA’s guidance specifically highlights patch-impact analysis, workarounds, change authorization and escalation when remediation thresholds are exceeded. Recording these comparisons helps an approver understand why a workaround was chosen and what would trigger replacement by a permanent fix.

What to document when a vulnerability stays open

An open finding should never be an unowned queue item. The record should contain:

  • A named service or system owner and a named remediation team.
  • The affected assets, versions, environments and evidence of applicability.
  • The risk rating, assumptions, threat information and policy basis for the target date.
  • The selected fix or mitigation, implementation status and test results to date.
  • Interim safeguards, their limits and the person responsible for monitoring them.
  • The approver with authority to accept residual risk, plus the approval date and expiry or review date.
  • Escalation triggers, such as a change in exploit activity, asset exposure or missed milestone.

Security can keep the record accurate and visible, but it should not convert an overdue item into a closed item merely because an exception was approved. Closure requires evidence that the correction or agreed mitigation meets the stated acceptance criteria.

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Common ownership failures and how to prevent them

Security is treated as the repair team

Security may discover a flaw and then receive an unworkable instruction to fix code or infrastructure it cannot access. Prevent this by assigning maintainers at intake and giving security authority to coordinate, prioritize and verify rather than perform every technical change.

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Engineering closes findings without risk context

A developer may patch one repository while vulnerable binaries remain in production, images or a second service. Require asset scope, deployment evidence and an independent verification step before closure.

No one owns supplier notices

Advisories can sit unread in a shared mailbox. Assign monitoring, map products to owners and require confirmation that updates or mitigations reached deployed instances.

Exceptions become permanent

An exception without an expiry date is an unreviewed risk acceptance. Require a review point, interim controls and escalation when conditions change.

Deadlines are copied from another organization

A fixed number of days may be appropriate in a particular contract or regulation but is not a universal rule. Tie each timeframe to the organization’s policy and explain how criticality and exposure affect it.

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Building the operating model

Document a responsibility matrix that names the monitoring, analysis, remediation, authorization and verification functions. Connect it to the normal work system used by engineering and operations so that reports become actionable tickets with owners, due dates and evidence fields. Define how urgent changes are approved, how supplier disclosures enter the queue, how risk acceptances are escalated and how metrics distinguish time to acknowledge, time to mitigate and time to permanently correct.

Review the model after significant incidents, reorganizations and changes in technology. The labels may differ—security operations, platform engineering, product engineering, IT operations or risk management—but the handoffs must remain explicit. NIST’s SSDF and NCCoE SSDF analysis provide a software-focused model, while OWASP’s Vulnerability Management Guide (June 1, 2020) emphasizes identifying the stakeholders who perform remediation and communicating through normal work systems. These are adaptable practices, not a mandated org chart.

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