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IBM’s warning is about a future capability, not a claim that existing quantum computers can already read encrypted internet traffic. A cryptographically relevant quantum computer could eventually undermine public-key systems such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, while attackers can collect encrypted data now and attempt to decrypt it later. That “harvest now, decrypt later” risk is why organizations should begin preparing before a machine capable of the attack exists.
What IBM is warning about
IBM Quantum describes a “harvest now, decrypt later” attack as the collection and storage of encrypted communications or other ciphertext today for possible decryption when quantum capabilities mature. An adversary might capture traffic crossing a network, copy encrypted databases, or retain archived communications. The data remains unreadable with current practical tools, but its long-term value can outlast the expected arrival of a machine able to attack the underlying cryptography.
IBM’s August 15, 2024 guidance says a quantum computer powerful enough to break public-key encryption may still be years away, yet the threat makes new encryption methods urgent now. The concern is therefore about confidentiality over time: information that must remain secret for five, 10 or more years could be exposed even if it is protected adequately today.
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Which encryption is most exposed?
The primary concern is public-key cryptography. RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography support key exchange, authentication, certificates, digital signatures and TLS connections used by websites, applications, devices and internal services. A sufficiently capable quantum computer using Shor’s algorithm could attack the mathematical problems on which these systems rely.
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This does not mean every encryption method fails in the same way. Symmetric encryption and hashing face different quantum effects and can generally be addressed through appropriate key sizes and updated guidance. The urgent migration challenge is that public-key algorithms are embedded throughout software, hardware, certificate systems, cloud platforms, networks, mainframes, backups and supplier products. Replacing one library rarely completes the job.
Why “Q-Day” has no reliable date
IBM’s public material does not establish a defensible year for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. Hardware scale, error correction and engineering progress remain uncertain. Organizations should not treat a particular “Q-Day” prediction as a deadline or assurance.
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The practical deadline is set by two factors that are already known: how long sensitive data must remain confidential and how long a technology migration takes. Encrypted information intercepted today can be stored indefinitely, while certificates, applications, devices and supplier contracts may require years to update. Waiting for a public demonstration of a quantum attack would leave no safe transition period.
What IBM and NIST have done
IBM says its researchers co-authored three of the four post-quantum cryptography algorithms published by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024. IBM also says it has worked with clients on quantum-safe transformations since 2019.
Jay Gambetta, IBM Fellow and Vice President of Quantum, described NIST’s first three post-quantum standards as a significant step toward a quantum-safe future. The standards provide algorithms designed to resist known quantum attacks while remaining usable on conventional computers. Adoption still requires testing, integration and coordination with certificate authorities, operating-system vendors, hardware providers and application suppliers.
How ready are organizations?
IBM’s 2025 Quantum Safe Readiness Index reports an average global readiness score of 25 out of 100. That figure is IBM’s index result, not a universal measurement of every company’s security posture. It nevertheless illustrates the gap between recognizing the issue and having an organization-wide migration plan.
A practical preparation sequence
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Inventory cryptography
Locate certificates, private keys, algorithms, protocol versions and cryptographic libraries across applications, cloud services, endpoints, network appliances, mainframes, backups and vendor-managed systems. Include systems that terminate TLS, sign software, authenticate users or exchange keys automatically.
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Classify data by required confidentiality lifetime
Identify records whose sensitivity extends five, 10 or more years. Prioritize designs, health information, financial records, identity data, legal material and proprietary research that would still be valuable if decrypted in the future.
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Make systems crypto-agile
Separate algorithm choices from application logic where possible. Build replaceable cryptographic modules, centrally managed certificate policies and documented key-rotation procedures so an algorithm change does not require a complete redesign.
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Plan a standards-based migration
Evaluate NIST’s finalized post-quantum algorithms against your workloads, devices and compliance requirements. During transition, hybrid classical/post-quantum arrangements may provide protection against both current threats and future quantum attacks where standards and products support them.
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Test suppliers and governance
Require vendors to disclose cryptographic inventories, supported algorithms, upgrade paths, certificate lifecycles and support dates. Ask specifically about products that terminate TLS, issue certificates, protect backups or store long-lived confidential data. Record ownership, dependencies and rollback procedures in the security program.
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Choosing between migration approaches
| Approach | Security assumptions | Typical scope | Main trade-offs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Classical-only replacement | Relies on current, non-quantum-resistant public-key algorithms | Applications, certificates or network protocols | May be simpler today but does not address a future quantum break |
| Post-quantum deployment | Uses algorithms designed to resist known quantum attacks | Application, network, endpoint or mainframe layers | Requires interoperability, performance and key/signature-size testing |
| Hybrid classical/post-quantum deployment | Combines classical and post-quantum security assumptions | Transitioning protocols and services | Can ease migration, but adds implementation and operational complexity |
For each option, assess algorithm and key sizes, signature or handshake overhead, hardware capacity, vendor lifecycle commitments, standards status and the visibility provided by your cryptographic inventory. A technically strong algorithm is not useful if a certificate system, embedded device or supplier cannot deploy it safely.
What a company should do this year
- Assign an executive owner and maintain a dated cryptographic asset inventory.
- Map data-retention obligations to the systems and keys protecting that data.
- Measure which applications can change algorithms without code rewrites.
- Run controlled tests of NIST post-quantum implementations and hybrid modes where available.
- Add quantum-readiness requirements to procurement, architecture reviews and supplier renewals.
- Track certificate, hardware and software end-of-support dates so migration work is tied to normal refresh cycles.
IBM’s broader Quantum Safe software and services offering is one possible route for organizations seeking a quantum-safe cryptography assessment or post-quantum migration services, but buyers should verify current capabilities, scope and commercial terms directly.
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