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AI agents need distinct identities, narrowly scoped authority, and a clear link to the people or systems that authorize their work. Traditional identity and access management remains a foundation, but it does not automatically govern software that can choose tools and act with limited supervision.
Why does agentic AI expose gaps in identity governance?
Conventional identity and access management (IAM) is designed to identify people and services, authenticate them, and decide what they may access. An AI agent can use tools and take actions across a workflow, sometimes without a person approving every step. That makes it important to know not only which agent acted, but who or what authorized it, for which task, and within what limits.
NIST authors Bill Fisher and Ryan Galluzzo describe the accountability problem when an agent uses a person’s credentials: “Doing so violates a core tenet of Identity and Access Management (IAM): enabling accountability by verifying both the identity and permissions of the individual or service attempting to complete a transaction.” Their article, published August 27, 2026, frames agent identity as an extension of a strong identity foundation—not a reason to discard existing IAM.
The practical goal is traceable, constrained action: each agent should be identifiable, associated with an accountable user or system, and authorized only for the work it needs to perform.
What identity should an AI agent have?
Give the agent a distinct identity
Represent each agent as its own principal rather than having it share a human’s login or credentials. A distinct identity makes it possible to distinguish the agent’s actions from the sponsor’s actions and to manage the agent’s access separately. Credential sharing obscures attribution and can create security, privacy, and legal issues.
Bind that identity to its sponsor and task
A separate agent identity is not enough on its own. Associate the agent’s identifiers, credentials, and entitlements with the identity of the user or system operating it. The record should make clear who sponsored or initiated the agent, what task it was authorized to perform, and which permissions supported that task.
This relationship is sometimes described as acting “on behalf of” a user or system. Governance should preserve both sides of the transaction: the agent that performed an action and the accountable identity that authorized the work.
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Authorize actions, not just identities
Authentication establishes which principal is acting; authorization determines what that principal may do. An agent can be correctly identified and still have excessive access. Scope permissions to the resources and actions needed for its task, and account for the initiating user or system and the agent’s current context.
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Static API keys, bearer tokens, broad role grants, and accumulated entitlements can leave an agent with persistent access beyond its immediate need. Using a newer authorization mechanism does not, by itself, guarantee least privilege or prevent permission creep.
Make delegation explicit and changeable
For delegated work, record who granted authority, to which agent, for what task, and subject to which constraints. Where feasible, constrain delegated authority so the agent cannot exceed the authority of the identity on whose behalf it acts. Provide a way to update or revoke access if the task, context, ownership, or agent changes.
NIST’s February 5, 2026 concept paper identifies dynamic policy updates, least privilege when future actions are not fully predictable, and “on behalf of” delegation as open implementation questions. These are design challenges, not problems that a single identity protocol resolves automatically.
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What can go wrong if an agent’s identity and access are poorly governed?
- Credential sharing: Actions may appear to come from a person rather than the agent, weakening attribution and accountability.
- Excessive standing access: Broad roles or long-lived credentials may let an agent reach data or tools unrelated to its current task.
- Ambiguous delegation: Investigators may be unable to determine who authorized an action, what authority was delegated, or what limits applied.
- Insufficient action records: Logs may not connect an agent’s action to its intent, task, and authorizing identity. NIST’s concept paper raises tamper-proof, verifiable logging as an open implementation question; it does not establish a universally agreed solution.
- Prompt-injection consequences: Direct or indirect prompt injection can influence an agent’s behavior. Identity controls do not prevent prompt injection, but constrained permissions and monitoring can limit and help investigate the resulting actions.
Which agent actions should require human approval?
Microsoft’s implementation guidance recommends human confirmation for irreversible or high-impact actions, including sending, deleting, purchasing, deploying, or changing permissions. This is vendor guidance, not a universal standard. Organizations should define approval rules based on the consequences of an action, the environment, and the ability to undo it.
Approval should be enforced at the point where the consequential action occurs, rather than relying only on a broad approval given when the agent is first configured. For lower-impact steps, an organization may allow the agent to proceed within its scoped permissions while recording what it did.
What should an agent’s governance lifecycle include?
Governance begins before an agent receives access and continues through changes in purpose, ownership, tools, and eventual retirement. Microsoft Entra ID Governance documentation describes agent identity features such as human sponsorship, identity blueprints, and access packages for time-bound, auditable access. Microsoft characterizes these agent governance features as preview; availability and status may change.
- Establish sponsorship: Assign a human or system owner accountable for the agent’s purpose and access.
- Register purpose and environment: Document what the agent is for and where it is allowed to operate.
- Control access: Record its identity, credentials, tools, data access, and delegated authority.
- Monitor and review: Keep action records useful for investigation, and review access when the sponsor, purpose, tools, or operating context changes.
- Disable and revoke: Define how to pause the agent and remove its credentials or entitlements when access is no longer justified.
How can teams put agent identity governance into practice?
- Inventory the agent. Record its owner or sponsor, purpose, environment, identity, credentials, tools, data access, delegated authority, and lifecycle state.
- Assign a distinct principal. Avoid shared human credentials so an agent’s actions can be distinguished from a person’s.
- Connect authorization to context. For each permission decision, retain the initiating user or system and the task; scope allowed resources and actions as narrowly as practical.
- Limit credential lifetime and access. Use time-limited credentials where feasible, and define how to rotate or revoke them.
- Record enough to investigate. Capture the agent identity, authorizing identity, task context, and actions in logs. Protect the records against unauthorized changes; NIST identifies verifiable agent logging as an implementation question.
- Require approval for consequential actions. Set explicit human-confirmation points for actions that are high impact or difficult to reverse.
- Reassess access over the lifecycle. Review permissions after changes to ownership, purpose, tools, or context, and disable the agent when it is no longer needed.
How should organizations assess identity and authorization approaches?
NIST’s current work treats agent identity and authorization as an emerging implementation challenge, not a settled replacement for existing identity standards. NIST’s NCCoE says it is exploring standards-based approaches to identify, manage, and authorize software agents, including AI agents, with the aim of providing practical guidance.
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In an update dated September 29, 2026, NIST said its first implementation use case would demonstrate agent identification, authentication, and authorization within the software development lifecycle. That is a project status update, not evidence that a final framework has already been published.
In an August 27, 2026 analysis, NIST named SPIFFE and OAuth 2.0 as relevant mechanisms and WIMSE and the Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant as emerging work. These mechanisms may contribute to identity or authorization flows, but none alone establishes lifecycle governance, policy enforcement, auditability, or protection from prompt injection.
When comparing implementation options, assess how well each addresses the following dimensions rather than assuming one protocol or product is sufficient:
| Evaluation area | Question to ask |
|---|---|
| Distinct agent identity | Can each agent be identified separately from its sponsor and from other agents? |
| Credential lifecycle | How are credentials issued, rotated, and revoked? |
| Scoped access | Can permissions be limited to the initiating identity, task, resource, and required action? |
| Delegation | Can the system represent who delegated authority and the constraints on that authority? |
| Attribution and audit | Can investigators connect actions to the agent, authorizing identity, and relevant task context? |
| Human oversight | Can approval be required for high-impact or difficult-to-reverse actions? |
| Lifecycle operations | Can teams sponsor, review, disable, and recover agent identities and access? |
NIST’s project is intended to explore standards-based approaches to agent identity and authorization. It does not establish a universal product winner or a single required architecture.
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