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Yes, an attack on operational technology (OT) could interfere with services that U.S. military operations depend on, and OT compromise can affect physical processes. But official sources establish a risk pathway—not that a specific OT attack has already caused a U.S. military operation to fail. The distinction matters: agencies have documented targeting and compromise involving industrial systems, while DoD has described its dependence on critical infrastructure and warned that adversaries may seek to disrupt it during a crisis.
How an OT attack can reach a physical process
Operational technology includes the hardware and software used to monitor or control equipment and industrial processes. Industrial control systems (ICS) are a common category of OT; programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and human-machine interfaces (HMIs) are examples of components used in those environments.
Unlike an attack limited to stealing or exposing data, OT compromise can affect how a process is monitored or controlled. Depending on the system and its configuration, consequences may range from nuisance manipulation to service interruption or a potential physical threat. A potential consequence is not proof that it occurred in a reported incident: actual impact depends on the access an attacker gains, the process involved, safeguards in place, and how operators respond.
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Government advisories describe several kinds of targeting and weaknesses in internet-connected industrial environments. They establish that OT systems have been targeted or affected; they do not show that every incident caused physical damage.
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| Activity or access path | What agencies reported | What the report establishes |
|---|---|---|
| Exposed OT and weak credentials | A May 2025 CISA, FBI, EPA, and DOE fact sheet says agencies are aware of incidents affecting OT and ICS at U.S. critical-infrastructure entities. It warns about internet-connected OT and default or easily guessed passwords. | Agencies describe incidents and risky exposure. The fact sheet does not establish that each incident caused a physical effect. |
| Small-scale OT targeting | A May 2024 multi-agency fact sheet describes pro-Russia hacktivists targeting OT in water and wastewater, dams, energy, and food and agriculture in North America and Europe. It cites exposed remote access, outdated VNC software, and factory-default or weak passwords. | The activity appeared mostly limited to nuisance effects. Investigations also identified techniques that could pose physical threats in insecure or misconfigured environments. |
| PLC compromise | A CISA, FBI, and NSA advisory, updated December 18, 2024, describes IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting PLCs in multiple sectors, including U.S. water and wastewater facilities. | The advisory documents exploitation activity and recommends securing internet-connected OT and PLCs. It does not establish a resulting military mission failure. |
| Energy-sector campaigns | A 2022 CISA, FBI, and DOE advisory describes Russian state-sponsored campaigns against energy organizations from 2011 to 2018. | The advisory warns that disabling or inhibiting a process’s ability to fail safely could have physical consequences. That is a risk warning, not a claim that every campaign caused such consequences. |
Why critical-infrastructure OT matters to military operations
The military depends on services beyond its own facilities. In a May 7, 2024 release, the Department of Defense identified energy, communications, transportation, water, and Defense Industrial Base services among the critical infrastructure it relies on to operate. DoD also said that China and Russia were actively targeting U.S. critical infrastructure to be positioned to disrupt society and interfere with DoD operations in a crisis.
The 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary similarly says adversaries may seek to hinder U.S. military mobilization and sow chaos during a crisis. These are official statements of dependency and strategic concern. They do not quantify the likelihood of an OT attack disrupting a military operation, nor document a specific U.S. operational failure caused by one.
The connection is indirect but consequential: if an OT-dependent service is disrupted, the effects could complicate the civilian and industrial support on which military activity relies. That is a credible pathway to interference, not evidence that disruption has already occurred.
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How to reduce exposure and preserve safe operations
Government guidance emphasizes reducing opportunities for unauthorized access while ensuring operators can keep critical processes safe and reliable. Disconnecting or isolating OT without accounting for process safety and operator procedures can itself create risk.
Reduce common access routes
- Remove OT connections to the public internet where they are not necessary.
- Replace default or easily guessed passwords with strong, unique credentials; check PLCs for default or absent passwords.
- Use multifactor authentication where appropriate, especially for remote access.
- Manage remote access, reduce unnecessary exposure, and address vulnerabilities through risk-based patch management. Test patches outside production before deployment.
Know what is connected and watch for problems
- Maintain inventories of OT assets and understand dependencies between IT and OT systems.
- Use logging and monitoring to help identify suspicious activity.
- Include physical security and regular assessments in the security program.
Plan for isolation, recovery, and manual operation
- Prepare incident-response and recovery plans, and exercise them with the people responsible for operating the systems.
- Identify workarounds and manual controls that can keep critical functions operating if OT networks must be isolated.
- Test manual controls and OT backups regularly. Confirm that operators can use them safely under realistic conditions.
CISA’s October 2024 announcement of an international guide to OT cybersecurity principles emphasizes considering how business decisions can affect OT security while supporting business continuity. In practice, cybersecurity changes need to account for both access risk and the safe operation of the process.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What the evidence does—and does not—show
Official advisories establish real targeting and compromise activity involving OT, including exposed devices, weak credentials, remote-access weaknesses, and PLC exploitation. They also explain how insecure or misconfigured systems can create nuisance effects or potential physical threats. DoD has stated that it relies on critical infrastructure and warned that adversaries may target it to interfere with military operations during a crisis.
Those facts support treating OT security as part of national resilience. They do not establish that a particular OT attack has disrupted a U.S. military operation, and the cited official sources provide no direct statistic for the probability, scale, or military effect of such an event.
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