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CloudSEK reports that an affiliate using the name Azazel operated with The Gentlemen ransomware tools and victim-negotiation channels while running a separate leak site, LEAKNED. The investigation describes one affiliate’s operation—not a complete account of The Gentlemen—and says victims in this campaign were published on LEAKNED rather than the group’s own leak site.
What CloudSEK says Azazel did
In its October 6, 2026 investigation, CloudSEK says an exposed directory and misconfigured storage server revealed an operation associated with an affiliate calling himself Azazel. According to CloudSEK, he reused The Gentlemen’s ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) tooling, negotiation channels and ransom-note template, but maintained LEAKNED as an independent publication site and kept extortion proceeds outside the group’s normal arrangement.
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That separation matters: using a RaaS platform’s tools and channels did not mean that the affiliate used the platform’s leak site or followed its usual financial arrangement. CloudSEK characterized the arrangement as unusual in the affiliate ecosystem. Its findings concern this reported case; they do not establish how every Gentlemen affiliate operated.
How the operation was organized
CloudSEK described three infrastructure nodes with different roles. The reported storage capacities are infrastructure figures, not a measure of how much victim data was stolen.
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| Node | Reported role | What CloudSEK reported |
|---|---|---|
| Victim-facing server | Command-and-control and file uploads | CloudSEK identified it as part of the operation’s victim-facing infrastructure (CloudSEK, 2026). |
| Operations staging server | Staging operational activity | CloudSEK described a separate server for staging (CloudSEK, 2026). |
| Publication and archive server | Publishing and retaining material | CloudSEK described a separate publication/archive node (CloudSEK, 2026). |
Across dedicated servers, CloudSEK reported more than 50 TB of raw physical storage, including a 22 TB long-term vault. It also reported MEGA as a final transfer destination. Those figures describe reported infrastructure and storage capacity; they should not be read as the amount of data exfiltrated.
The recurring access path: exposed GitLab secrets
CloudSEK identified more than two dozen organizations across six countries. That is the roster identified in its investigation, not a guarantee of the campaign’s total reach or an independently confirmed count of every affected organization.
Outside the separate AI-platform incident discussed below, CloudSEK says the recurring access path centered on credentials exposed through GitLab CI/CD variable stores and repository history. The affiliate reportedly extracted tokens, database credentials, API keys and SSH keys. A token could provide access to services and infrastructure spanning more than one organization, so a credential exposed in one development environment could have consequences beyond that project.
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Why repository history matters
Removing a credential from the current version of a repository does not by itself make it safe: an older commit may still contain it. The reported chain makes both CI/CD secret stores and the full history of repositories relevant places to investigate when assessing possible exposure.
A separate, sustained compromise of an AI platform
CloudSEK distinguishes a more sustained compromise of an AI platform from the recurring GitLab-secret path. For this one engagement, it reported more than 6 TB of data exfiltrated. The report describes an unvalidated URL-fetching endpoint that enabled access to internal services, followed by credential decryption, recovery of a token from Git history, offline cracking of monitoring credentials, and a sweep of Kubernetes and infrastructure.
This is a sequence CloudSEK attributed to that platform engagement, not a template for every victim or the routine path across the identified organizations. The reported 6 TB figure belongs to this one engagement.
What the MCP finding does—and does not—show
CloudSEK documented one confirmed operational use of MCP in this investigation: a script called a locally bound MCP server to perform verification checks across systems in a victim environment. The report also describes related scripts and scanning for exposed assistant ports.
The finding is evidence of a tool being used during operations in this case. CloudSEK’s report does not establish that MCP caused the compromise, that every victim environment used MCP, or that this was the first operational use of MCP by any threat actor.
How this case fits the wider Gentlemen operation
Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks the operators behind The Gentlemen as Storm-2697. In a May 28, 2026 technical analysis, Microsoft described The Gentlemen as a RaaS platform managed by operators while affiliates carry out attacks; it said the operation emerged around mid-2025 and opened to affiliates in September 2025. Microsoft also described a Go ransomware encryptor, self-propagation and double extortion.
Those are broader observations about the platform and its operators, not details that CloudSEK’s case study independently establishes about every part of Azazel’s operation. Naming conventions can also differ among researchers: Storm-2697 is Microsoft’s tracking name.
Bangladesh’s e-GOV CIRT advisory described a 90 percent affiliate share for the program. That is the advisory’s characterization of the program; it does not establish the share Azazel personally received. The reported independent collection of proceeds in this case is a separate finding attributed to CloudSEK.
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CloudSEK’s recommendations address the techniques it says it observed. They can reduce exposure and improve detection, but they are not a guarantee against compromise.
- Protect pipeline credentials: Store CI/CD credentials in a dedicated secrets manager rather than raw pipeline variables. Audit repository history for credentials that were removed from current files but remain in older commits, rotate exposed tokens, and alert on unusual reads of pipeline secrets.
- Constrain privileged tools: Bind MCP servers only to strict loopback interfaces, treat execution tools as privileged, and audit their use. Monitor for unexpected assistant-port exposure and investigate it in the context of the environment rather than assuming a port scan proves compromise.
- Limit access and watch for bulk movement: Apply least privilege to object-storage and service accounts, and monitor for unexpected bulk mirroring or transfers.
- Separate and test recovery: Keep backup credentials and infrastructure separate from production, and test restoration so that backup availability is not assumed solely from successful backup jobs.
Separate guidance from Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 discusses measures including patching exploited vulnerabilities, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, credential rotation, endpoint-detection tamper protection, SMB signing, network segmentation and restricting ESXi management access. Vulnerability-specific advice and indicators can change, so organizations should consult current advisories for their own products and exposure.
Sources and scope
The specific affiliate findings, infrastructure description, victim roster, AI-platform sequence, MCP evidence and defensive recommendations above are attributed to CloudSEK’s “Caught in 4K: The Gentlemen Files,” published October 6, 2026. Microsoft’s “The Gentlemen ransomware: Dissecting a self-propagating Go encryptor” (May 28, 2026) provides the platform context and Microsoft’s Storm-2697 designation. Bangladesh’s e-GOV CIRT issued “The Gentlemen Ransomware: A Rapidly Scaling RaaS Threat Targeting Bangladesh” on August 9, 2026. ITPro’s October 6, 2026 report quotes CloudSEK’s organizational statement about LEAKNED; that secondary account is not independent forensic corroboration of the investigation.
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