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Yes. China remained Southeast Asia’s largest infrastructure-financing partner in 2024, accounting for about 31% of regional infrastructure spending. But the flow of commitments to new Chinese infrastructure projects appears to have stalled for a third consecutive year, according to the Lowy Institute. These findings describe different things: spending includes activity supported by existing projects, while new commitments indicate whether additional projects are being taken on.
China’s lead is clear in regional spending
The Lowy Institute’s 11 October 2026 article, part of its 2026 Southeast Asia Aid Map Report, says the six largest financiers accounted for 90% of the region’s infrastructure spending in 2024. China was the largest, with about 31%. Japan followed at 21%, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) at 17%, and the World Bank at 10%.
| Financier | Share of Southeast Asia infrastructure spending | Period and measure |
|---|---|---|
| China | About 31% | 2024 spending |
| Japan | 21% | 2024 comparison reported by Lowy |
| Asian Development Bank | 17% | 2024 comparison reported by Lowy |
| World Bank | 10% | 2024 comparison reported by Lowy |
Across the period since 2015, China accounted for 39% of regional infrastructure spending, the article says. That longer-period figure is not an annual share and should not be read as a measure of new project signings. The four named financiers in the table are not the whole field; the six largest together made up 90% of 2024 spending.
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Why a spending lead can coexist with a signing slowdown
Spending and new commitments are not interchangeable. Money spent in a given year can support projects already underway, while a newly signed or committed project concerns future activity. China’s accumulated role in existing projects therefore helps explain how it can remain the biggest partner even as the pipeline of new commitments weakens.
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The Lowy article says commitments to new Chinese infrastructure projects appear to have stalled for the third consecutive year. It does not supply exact annual commitment totals, a count of projects, or a precise operational definition of a new commitment in the available article summary. The trend is therefore best understood as a reported slowdown, not a quantified claim about how many projects were signed or how much money was pledged each year.
Infrastructure remains central to China’s development finance
Almost 90% of China’s official development finance (ODF) spending in Southeast Asia in 2024 went to infrastructure, according to Lowy. The infrastructure share varied by country:
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| Country | Infrastructure share of China’s 2024 ODF | Example cited by Lowy |
|---|---|---|
| Cambodia | 64% | Not stated in the article summary |
| Philippines | 100% | $213 million in 2024 ODF for the Kaliwa Dam |
| Myanmar | 55% | Not stated in the article summary |
Lowy also cites $247.5 million in China’s 2024 ODF for Phnom Penh airport. These project-level figures are examples from the article; they do not establish that every country’s infrastructure spending or project pipeline followed the same pattern.
Lowy’s explanation: a more selective financing role
The authors interpret the slowdown as a shift toward selectivity: away from ambitious megaprojects and toward smaller projects that are easier to manage. This is their analysis of the pattern, rather than a demonstrated single cause. The available summary does not give country-by-country new-signing data or evidence to isolate why commitments slowed.
The broader financing environment is difficult. Lowy puts Southeast Asia’s infrastructure financing gap at around $3.1 trillion when adjusted for climate impacts. It says reduced aid has constrained the concessional capital that can help make blended finance work, while economic and fiscal shocks have weighed on investor appetite. The figure describes a regional gap adjusted for climate impacts; it is not a sum of China’s commitments or an estimate of China’s share of future costs.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Multilateral banks could take a larger role
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) accounted for 32% of regional ODF infrastructure spending in 2024. Lowy reports that MDB spending and commitments have increased since 2022 and sees potential for them to play a larger role. That share uses the ODF infrastructure-spending measure, so it should not be directly compared with the partner shares of overall infrastructure spending listed earlier.
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The distinction matters for the outlook: China’s existing portfolio can sustain its leading spending position, while a larger future role for MDBs depends on continued financing and commitments. The figures establish an opportunity, not a guarantee that multilateral funding will replace projects that China no longer takes on.
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